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Regulating Land Use in a
Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional
Contexts of Exactions
MARK FENSTER*

INTRODUCTION

The regulatory takings doctrine, the Supreme Court declared in
Lingle v. Chevron, concerns the effects of a regulation on the incidents of
property ownership.' It serves as a constitutional protection against
regulations that impose the functional equivalent to a classic taking of
private property (an appropriation by the state or an ouster), and it
requires compensation for owners who are subject to such regulations.'
Just as significant as declaring what the regulatory takings doctrine is, the
Court in Lingle also declared what it is not: it is not a judicial check on
the validity or reasonableness of a regulation that effects a taking.3 While
the Takings Clause4 serves to correct an unfair outcome due to
government regulation, it does not authorize substantive judicial review
of government's discretionary decision to regulate.5
In the same term that the Court explained the Takings Clause in this
apparently coherent manner,6 it also took a backward glance at its
* Associate Professor, Levin College of Law, University of Florida. Many thanks to excellent
research assistance from Robert Bowser, Amanda Harrison, and especially Kate Dozark and Leslie
Utiger. Summer research funding provided by the Levin College of Law helped enable the completion
of this project.
i. See 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2oo5).
2. Id. at 536-37.
3. Id. at 542-45.
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[Nior shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
5. See infra text accompanying notes 143-49. The Takings Clause incidentally limits
governmental discretion to affect property in particular ways, but this is a secondary issue. The
Takings Clause does not directly affect the government's authority to regulate; it merely requires that
once the regulation has particular effects, the government must compensate for the losses associated
with those effects. See id.

6. "Apparently coherent," that is, insofar as it can be, considering the doctrine's prior manifest
incoherence-one which the Court recognized a generation ago, at the beginning of the modern era of
regulatory takings, and which has persisted to the present. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New
York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-24 (1978) (noting that identifying a regulatory taking "has proved to be a
[729]
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"exactions" jurisprudence.7 This glance was revealing for what it showed
about the Court's relative deference to the web of government
institutions that shape land use regulation on the ground. A product of
its two earlier decisions in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission8 and
Dolan v. City of Tigard,9 the Court's exactions rules limit what a
regulatory agency (typically a local government) engaged in land use
control can exact from a property owner as a condition for
development. '° Put briefly, the Court's holdings in those decisions
restricted governments to conditions, or "exactions," that have an
"essential nexus" to the harm expected from the proposed
development," and that create a burden on the property owner that is in
"rough proportionality" to that harm.' An exaction that fails to meet
either of these tests requires the government to compensate the property
owner for the property that the exaction has taken.'3 Nollan and Dolan
thereby limit and channel the regulatory discretion of local governments,
acting as an external check on a land use planning process that a majority
of the justices considered prone to exploitation.'4
The exactions decisions sit uneasily alongside the Court's recent
effort in Lingle to make sense of its long, confusing line of takings
problem of considerable difficulty"); Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine,24
CARDOZo L. REV. 93, 97 n.2 (2002) (citing the extensive law review literature complaining of the
doctrine's incoherence).
7. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005). In this Article, I will use the
general term "exactions" to refer to all conditions on development, including the dedication of land,
fees in lieu of dedication, or impact fees. I will occasionally use the term "impact fee" to refer to a type
of exaction: monetary conditions on development intended to address directly a particular anticipated
impact from the proposed development. See also infra note 34 (listing and explaining other types of
exactions). But because this article concerns the Supreme Court's broad, abstract approach to
development conditions, I will generally use the term "exaction" rather than confuse the constitutional
issue with more precise regulatory terminology.
8. 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
9. 512U.S.374,386(I994).
so. By "exactions rules" I mean that Nollan and Dolan were efforts to impose clear and stable
rule-formalist constraints on lower courts and local governments. See Mark Fenster, Takings
Formalism,Regulatory Formulas: Exactionsand the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REV. 6o9, 62935 (2004); cf. JIM Rossi, REGULATORY BARGAINING AND PUBLIC LAW 107-09 (2005) (praising Nollan and

Dolan for bringing certainty to regulatory process through their use of more precise formal rules than
the balancing standards that dominate takings jurisprudence).
II. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
12. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
13. Id. at 396; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831.
54. The Court's concern about local government overreaching in the planning process was
clearest when Justice Scalia, in his Nollan decision, characterized any exaction that failed to advance
the police powers objectives the government sought to further as "an out-and-out plan of extortion" a characterization that Chief Justice Rehnquist repeated in Dolan. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted); Dolan, 512 U.S. at 387 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). See generally Lee Ann Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions
Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. I, 15 (2ooo) (noting the Court's skepticism about local governmental
regulation in its exactions decisions).
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decisions. Nollan and Dolan look to the particular effect that a condition
will have on a property owner, and in that regard are consistent with the
Court's takings jurisprudence. 5 On the other hand, Nollan and Dolan
allow courts to consider the validity of the relationship between the
condition and the government's stated regulatory purpose.'6 They
therefore mandate judicial review of a local government's substantive
regulatory practice, as well as of the justification that local officials use to
explain the regulation. It is no wonder, then, that Justice O'Connor
attempted to reconcile the Court's emergent takings theory with its
exactions decisions in Lingle.'7 The exactions decisions, she asserted, are
no more than a limited check on governmental efforts to impose, via a
regulatory condition, a confiscatory or functionally equivalent taking of
property without compensation in an individualized regulatory act."
Accordingly, under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, when the
government has taken land without compensation, judicial review must
check the relationship between the taking and the government's stated
regulatory need.'9 Nollan and Dolan, in this explanation, apply to a
limited universe of potential exactions. When they do not apply, courts
review a challenged exaction using some lower level of scrutiny: either
the Court's own ad hoc, multi-factor balancing test from Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York," or, more likely, an exactionsspecific test developed by state courts under state law.2'
If only this explanation ended the saga. Because Lingle's entire
discussion of Nollan and Dolan could be dismissed as non-binding dicta,"
and because the Court refused to provide further and more explicit
clarity despite its opportunity to do so in a case for which it accepted
review of another, separate takings question, 3 some of the precise
boundaries and implications of the exactions decisions remain uncertain.
The Court's exactions rules check government discretion only selectively,
while leaving it up to other governmental institutions, as well as to
developers, homeowners, voters, and the market for local governments'
packages of taxes and services, to check discretion over exactions to
which Nollan and Dolan do not apply. For many commentators, and

15. See Dolan, 512 U.S. 374; Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.

16. See Dolan, 512 U.S. 374; Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.

17. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 545-48 (2005).
i8. Id. at 546-47.
i9. Id. at 547-48.
20. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Lingle made plain that when a special category did not exist, the
Penn Central analysis applies. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538-40.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 45-46, 200-04 (describing different levels of scrutiny
applied by state courts under state law).
22. See infra text accompanying notes r65-67.
23. See infra Part III.A (discussing the questions presented in the petition for certiorari in San
Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco,545 U.S. 323 (2005)).
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even for some justices, this unevenness and confusion are untenable:
heightened scrutiny should apply either to all exactions or to none.'
This Article argues that Lingle affirms and justifies this
unevenness-even though its explanation may frustrate both property
rights advocates and planning advocates, who view the Court's exactions
jurisprudence as either an inadequate or an onerous effort to limit local
discretion. Lingle marks the Court's ultimate shift in its regulatory
takings jurisprudence toward viewing the Takings Clause as a
constitutional command to respect institutional competence. It focuses
on the question of who should decide the limits of a regulatory burden
on property rights, rather than on the substantive issue of what a federal
constitutional definition of property rights should be, and it affirms the
passive virtue of deference." It thus clarifies that the Takings Clause
serves as a shield for property owners only in those limited instances in
which a regulatory agency imposes certain types of exactions in certain
ways, thereby confiscating land in a manner that is highly suspect. This
appears to leave local governments with a significant degree of discretion
outside of those instances when confiscatory exactions are most likely to
be imposed. But other institutions, most prominently state legislatures
and courts, can limit local discretion. And they do-even more so now,6
since exactions have become more widely used as a regulatory tool.,
Ultimately, in its relatively late arrival to exactions and its uneven efforts
to police them, the Court has contributed to a complicated web of
institutional restraints on local government. Lingle affirms that the
Takings Clause fills only a minimal role, though an occasionally powerful
one, in this web of institutions that oversee or otherwise limit local
discretion.
This Article seeks not to praise Nollan and Dolan, nor to revere
Lingle's efforts to clarify those earlier decisions' limits. The exactions
and consequentially
decisions are conceptually, normatively,
unsatisfactory,27 while Lingle itself improves upon and clarifies, but does
not fully resolve, many of the doctrinal and regulatory messes the Court
has created in the last three decades of its regulatory takings decisions.
Rather, this Article explains Lingle, and the web of institutional
24. Compare J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the "Essential Nexus": How State and Federal
Courts Have Applied Nollan and Dolan and Where They Should Go from Here, 59 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 373, 397-401 (2002) (arguing that Nollan and Dolan's heightened scrutiny should apply to all
exactions), with Frank Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 16oo, i607-09 (1988) (arguing

that, read narrowly, Nollan does not create a special category of heightened scrutiny for exactions, but
merely extends the longstanding compensation requirement for unconditional permanent physical
occupations to occupations that are imposed conditionally).
25. See Mark Fenster, Takings, Version 2005: The Legal Process of Constitutional Property Rights,
9 U. PENN. J. CON. L. (forthcoming 2007).
26. See infra Parts IV.A-C.

27. See infra Part II.C.
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restraints on exactions that it invokes, as an imperfect but ultimately
satisfactory solution to controlling local discretion in a post-Nollan and Dolan world. Lingle signals both that lower courts should limit Nollan
and Dolan's application and that other levels of government, acting
outside the control of the Court's exactions rules, but within the shadow
they cast, can limit-and indeed, frequently have limitedmunicipalities' discretion to impose exactions. 8
Parts I and II of this Article describe exactions and the judicial
review of exactions prior to the 2004 Term. This history has already been
described extensively; 9 my purpose in these two parts is to focus upon
how exactions work as a means to exercise regulatory discretion and how
judicial review acts as one means to limit and channel that discretion.
After describing the rise of exactions in land use regulation, Part I
concludes that exactions are appreciably less than perfect but are
nevertheless necessary as a regulatory tool that enables the granting of
entitlements to develop land while forcing at least some cost
internalization as a condition of those entitlements. Part II summarizes
Nollan and Dolan and concludes that these decisions are also appreciably
less than perfect but may be necessary as a means to protect landowners
from oppressive conditions imposed by local governments. Part III
explains what the Court did and did not say about exactions in its 2004
Term. Part IV attempts both to make sense of the Court's actions and to
justify the limitations the Court has placed on Nollan and Dolan's
application, by describing other institutions and legal authorities that can
check local discretion.
I. EXACTIONS, PRE-2005: THE RISE OF REGULATORY DISCRETION

A. EXACTIONS AND THE EMERGENCE OF LOCAL ADMINISTRATIVE
DISCRETION

When owners seek to subdivide their parcels, initiate major
construction projects, or intensify the use of their land, they typically
must seek one or more discretionary approvals from the jurisdiction's
zoning authority or legislative body.3" The exercise of governmental

28. See infra Part IV.A.
29. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS 341-51
(1995); Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constrainton Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine,91 COLUM. L. REV. 473 (I99I); David A. Dana, Land Use Regulation in an Age of
Heightened Scrutiny, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1243 (1997); Fennell, supra note 14; Fenster, supra note so;
Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land Use Regulation: Paying for Growth
with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177 (2o06).
30. See ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSE A. GOMEZ-IBA&,rEZ, REGULATION FOR REVENUE: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF LAND USE EXACTIONS 54-55 (1993); Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., How the West Was Won:
Takings and Exactions-CaliforniaStyle, in TRENDS IN LAND USE LAW FROM A TO Z 193, 225-26
(Patricia E. Salkin ed., 2001).
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discretion at the approval stage was not originally part of the
"Euclidean" approach to zoning, which relied upon static zoning maps
and ordinances either to authorize as a matter of right or ban entirely
certain types of land uses in certain identified areas.' In contemporary
practice, however, local governments typically retain some degree of
discretion in their comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances to
approve or reject proposals from developers and property owners.32
Over the past three decades,33 exactions have served as a flexible
regulatory tool that government authorities use as a condition for issuing
approvals, especially in fast-growing communities.' 4 Exactions require
property owners to provide some entitlement, promise, or fee that serves
a public need and is related in some way to the expected external costs to
the community of the owner's new use of her land.35 If the property
owner refuses, the local government can reject the development proposal
under its police power authority-subject to liability, of course, for any
violation of constitutional or state law. In this way, exactions 'are, in
William Fischel's words, "payments for permissions that can be
withheld. ' ' , 6 In the process of imposing exactions, a local government
may apply a pre-existing set of criteria or formulas to the property
owner's proposal in order to derive the exactions it will require, or it may
negotiate with the property owner over the types and extent of exactions

31. See Ira Michael Heyman, Legal Assaults on Municipal Land Use Regulation, 5 URB.LAW. 1, 2
(1973), reprinted in THE LAND USE AWAKENING: ZONING LAW IN THE SEVENTIES 51-52 (Robert H.
Freilich & Eric 0. Stuhler eds., 1981); AM. PLANNING ASS'N, PLANNING ADVISORY SERVICE REPORT No.
491/492, A GLOSSARY OF ZONING, DEVELOPMENT, AND PLANNING TERMS 94 (Fay Dolnick & Michael
Davidson eds., 1999) ("Euclidean zoning").
32. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 86, 9o-92 (3d ed. 2005).
33. One could date exactions to the imposition of subdivision controls that began in the early
years of zoning and especially in the post-Depression era, when local governments, which had been

saddled with poorly planned and financed subdivisions after the collapse of the 1920S land boom,
began to require new development to provide at least parts of the infrastructure it would need. See
Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 198-204. But their prevalence has grown dramatically during the postwar suburban boom period, as has the scope of projected costs they have been used to offset. See id. at
206-09.

34. See Vicki Been, Impact Fees and Housing Affordability, 8 CITYSCAPE 139, 142 (2005). The term
"exactions" includes; among other types, the dedication of land for the siting of public services or
amenities (such as schools or parks), fees in lieu of dedication, impact fees to fund the provision of
public services, and linkages, off-site development impact exactions intended to address effects linked
to an approved development, such as the increased need for affordable housing that might result from
commercial and/or office development. See Been, supra note 29, at 479-81; Thomas W. Ledman, Local
Government Environmental Mitigation Fees: Development Exactions, The Next Generation, 45 FLA. L.
REV. 835, 842-53 (1993); Theodore C. Taub, Exactions, Linkages, and Regulatory Takings: The
Developer's Perspective, 20 URB. LAW. 515, 524 (1988).
35. See MICHAEL J.

MESHENBERG, THE ADMINISTRATION

OF FLEXIBLE ZONING TECHNIQUES 3-4

(American Society of Planning Officials Planning Advisory Service Report No. 318, 1976); Carol M.
Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as Problem of Local Legitimacy, 71 CAL. L.
REV. 839, 879-8o (1983).
36. WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS 6 (2OO1).
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it will impose.37 By using exactions to require financial or in-kind
provision of infrastructure that will at a minimum remedy the proposed
project's anticipated negative impacts, local governments have sought to
shift to new development the infrastructural and service costs that such
development would otherwise create-costs that would otherwise fall to
the municipalities (and, in turn, to existing residents)."
Exactions, in short, are key regulatory tools in a localized,
discretionary regime in which elected and appointed government officials
wield significant power over one of the key political, social, and fiscal
issues facing local government: land development.39 The American model
of governance views such administrative discretion with great skepticism,
and vests the authority to exercise such discretion only with structural
and formal constraints.4' Such constraints range from the checks and
balances of the tri-partite federal system, and the limited authority that
local governments enjoy as subsidiary agents of the states that create
them, to the substantive and procedural constraints placed on
governmental authorities by constitutional and statutory texts'
Unsurprisingly, then, long before the Supreme Court jumped into the
fray in Nollan and Dolan, other levels of government had sought to

37. See DANIEL P. SELMI & JAMES A. KUSHNER, LAND USE REGULATION I60-63 (2d ed. 2004).
o
38. See ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBAhEZ, supra note 3 , at 7, 62-63, 77, 95-96. On the growing
infrastructural deficit and financial crunch that local governments face, and the limited alternatives to
exactions that they have, see id. at 17, 23-26; Paul P. Downing & Thomas S. McCaleb, The Economics
of Development Exactions, in DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS 43, 44-5o (James E. Frank & Robert M.
Rhodes eds., 1987); Rosenberg, supra note 29, at 183-91. On the "fiscalization" of land use decisions
generally, see Jonathan Schwartz, Prisonersof Proposition i3: Sales Taxes, Property Taxes, and the
Fiscalizationof Municipal Land Use Decisions, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 183 (1997).
39. See Carol M. Rose, The Ancient Constitution vs. the FederalistEmpire: Anti-Federalismfrom
the Attack on "Monarchism" to Modern Localism, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 74, 95 (I99o). The nearautonomy of local governments in the administration of land use in their jurisdictions, and the
significance of land use regulation to local governance, has largely withstood efforts by state

government to rein in local control. See DAVID R.
(2003).

BERMAN, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE STATES

33-35

40. On the history of limits on federal agency discretion, see generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
1870-196o, at 213-46 (1992) (detailing the development of a
proceduralist administrative law to check administrative agencies); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL 94-127 (2000) (detailing the debates over the constitutional checks
on the emergent federal administrative state in the early twentieth century). On the history of limits
placed on local government discretion by state government, see generally GERALD FRUG, ClIY MAKING
45-50 (is9); BERMAN, supra note 26, at 144-47. On the complicated relationship between the federal
government and local governments, including the underlying constitutional issue of federalism, see
David J. Barron, A Localist Critique of the New Federalism, 51 DUKE L.J. 377 (2001); Nestor M.
Davidson, CooperativeLocalism: Federal-LocalCollaborationin an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2007).
41. See generally BERMAN, supra note 26; FRUG, supra note 40, at 45-5o; HORWITZ, supra note 40,
at 213-46 (detailing the development of a proceduralist administrative law to check administrative
agencies); WHITE, supra note 40, at 94-127 (detailing the debates over the constitutional checks on the
emergent federal administrative state in the early twentieth century).

TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:729

check municipal discretion to impose exactions.42 This occurred both
implicitly, through state court decisions holding that local governments
lacked sufficient authority to set such conditions on development or that
the conditions violated an applicable state constitutional provision, 3 and
explicitly, through state statutes that authorized but set limits on such
conditions.' Prior to Nollan, state courts had relied upon their own state
constitutional, statutory, and common law doctrines to develop various
standards of review for land use exactions; some of those imposed a form
of heightened, or even strict, scrutiny on exactions, while others were far
more deferential.45 Indeed, the Supreme Court claimed to base its rough
proportionality test in Dolan on what it found to be the most reasonable
of the state court precedents. 6
B.

THE IMPERFECTIONS OF EXACTIONS

As a regulatory tool, exactions promise an efficient means to force
new development to "pay its own way" by internalizing its anticipated
external costs.47 Exactions thereby appear to represent an exemplary tool
of "smart growth," insofar as they enable an expansion of residential
housing supply at its true cost without burdening the existing
community."s In theory, if an omniscient, omnipotent, and fair local
government could design and implement perfect conditions on
42. See R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community Benefit
Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 50 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 9-I9 (1987).
43. See, e.g., City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., Inc., 355 So. 2d 363, 364-65 (Ala. 1978)
(invalidating as beyond statutory authority fees imposed in lieu of park land dedication); Haugen v.
Gleason, 359 P.2d io8, sIt (Or. i96I) (invalidating fee imposed on residential developers in lieu of
park land dedication because failure of ordinance to limit use of funds to benefit made the fee a tax,
which the county had no statutory authority to impose); John J. Delaney et al,, The Needs-Nexus
Analysis: A Unified Test for Validating Subdivision Exactions, User Impact Fees and Linkage, 50 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 146 n.49 (1987) (citing cases in which courts invalidated exactions for lack of
statutory authority).
44. See Delaney et al., supra note 43, at 146.
45. See id. at 146-56 (summarizing differing state approaches pre-Nollan).
46. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 389-91 (s994) (summarizing various state
approaches to the relationship between the exaction and the proposed development). But see Matthew
J. Cholewa & Helen L. Edmonds, Federalism and Land Use After Dolan: Has the Supreme Court
Taken Takings from the States?, 28 URB. LAW. 4OI, 415-16 (1996) (arguing that Court misread many of
the state court decisions it summarized in Dolan).
47. See, e.g., ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBARiEZ, supra note 30, at 3-4; Gus Bauman & William H.
Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey of American Practices,50 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 51, 52 (1987); Stewart E. Sterk, Competition Among Municipalities As a Constrainton Land
Use Exactions, 45 VAND. L. REv. 831, 832 (1992); Edward J. Sullivan & Isa Lester, The Role of the
Comprehensive Plan in InfrastructureFinancing,37 URB. LAW. 53, 61 (2005).
48. See J. Celeste Sakowicz, Urban Sprawl: Florida'sand Maryland'sApproaches, i9 J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 377, 395-96 (2003); Samuel R. Staley, Reforming the Zoning Laws, in A GUIDE TO SMART
GROWTH: SHATTERING MYTHS, PROVIDING SOLUTIONS 61, 73 (Jane S. Shaw & Ronald D. Utt eds., 2000);

Michael Allan Wolf, Earning Deference: Reflections on the Merger of Environmental and Land-Use
Law, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 253, 263 (2002).
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development, the resulting regulatory acts would be models of efficiency,
achieved with minimal administrative costs and easily passing the nexus
and proportionality tests.49 These hyper-efficient exactions would be so
perfect, in fact, that they likely would garner a broad democratic
consensus among the citizenry. After all, the new development would
simultaneously increase the local tax base and reveal a welcoming,
inclusive community, all without imposing any burden on the citizenry.
But of course local governments are neither omniscient nor
omnipotent." They rely on imperfect information and guesswork about
the expected externalized costs of development-albeit expensive,
professionally derived information and guesswork-to impose exactions
that are inevitably imperfect." Nor do exactions capture the full range of
impacts for new development, as non-omnipotent local governments
frequently either shy away from imposing full-cost exactions or are
barred from doing so by their state legislatures. 2 Exactions focus almost
entirely on infrastructure and are only rarely used to consider socioeconomic issues such as housing and employment needs that
comprehensive planning otherwise considers. 3 And where inexpert and
lenient exactions appear to give a relatively free pass to developers that
have captured the local government's regulatory process, exactions can
appear to encourage weak, potentially corrupt bargains that enable
development while passing its costs onto the community.54
49. See Stewart E. Sterk, Nollan, Henry George, and Exactions, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1731, 1732-36
(1988) (positing that a sufficiently comprehensive exaction program could be efficient). On the
omniscient model in land use planning, see Neil Komesar, Housing, Zoning, and the Public Interest, in
PUBLIC INTEREST LAW: AN ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 218, 220-21

ed., 1978).
50. See Sterk, supra note 49, at 1738-42.
5i. See DANIEL POLLAK, CALIFORNIA RESEARCH
AMENDMENT

TAKINGS

DECISIONS CHANGED

(Burton A. Weisbrod

BUREAU, HAVE THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S 5TH

LAND USE

PLANNING IN CALIFORNIA?

124-29 (2000);

Fenster, supra note Io, at 644.
52. See POLLAK, supra note 51, at 23-25; Jonathan M. Davidson et al., "Where's Dolan?":
Exactions Law in 1998, 30 URB. LAW. 683, 697 (1998); Fenster, supra note Io, at 654-61; Laurie
Reynolds & Carlos A. Ball, Exactions and the Privatizationof the Public Sphere, 21 J.L. & POL. 451,
471 (2005). For example, the city of Albuquerque, New Mexico, due to developers' opposition, waited
nearly a decade after receiving statutory authority to impose impact fees to adopt a formula for their

use. See Anita P. Miller, New Mexico Development Impact Fees, in

DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES IN THE

ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION 57, 67 (J. Bart Johnson & James van Hemert eds., 2d ed. 2005). Moreover,

even presuming the possibility of perfect information and a willing and powerful government, a
"perfect" exaction presumes a universally recognizable community baseline from which new
development's costs are taking the community and to which exactions will return the community. See
Fennell, supra note 14, at 64-65.
53. See Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer, The Legal Issues of Capital Facilities Funding, in PRIVATE
SUPPLY OF PUBLIC SERVICES

51, 63 (Rachelle Alterman ed., 1988).

54. On the problems of bias, capture, and corruption in the land use process, see ELLICKSON &
BEEN, supra note 32, at 364-68; Bradley C. Karkkainen, Zoning: A Reply to the Critics, Io J. LAND USE
& ENVTL. L. 45, 86-89 (1994). In the period prior to the widespread delegation to local governments of
authority to impose exactions, courts frequently struck down as illegal "contract zoning" those land
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Exactions also create distributional inequities. Some commentators
and economists have asserted that the costs of exactions, once passed
along to new homeowners, make housing less affordable to those who
can least afford it. 5 However, the evidence about the relationship
between impact fees and housing costs is mixed. 56 Exactions can also
make the local allocation of resources more unequal. In fact, exactions
are popular with local governments because they produce non-tax
revenue that can finance capital construction and public services at a
time when municipalities with limited taxing authority face increasing
fiscal obligations.57 Local governments' reliance on exactions to finance
infrastructure and services has helped transform municipalities into
quasi-private, pay-as-you-go service providers. As a result, new services
and infrastructure go disproportionately to those who can afford them;
those who would depend upon the allocation of general tax revenues for
the provision of public facilities and services, and those who cannot
afford the incremental costs required to pay for them, ultimately receive
less."' Local government that bases its allocation decisions increasingly on
putatively unbiased, scientific efforts to internalize external costs
becomes less participatory and less interested in furthering the principles
of collective, community-based decision-making that proponents of
democratic cities advocate.59
Nor are local governments always fair in their dealings with their
citizens, much less with outsiders to whom they have little incentive to be
fair. The well-known, general critiques of local government as
majoritarian, factional, and exclusive are common rebuttals to the
progressive and civic republican ideal of a rational, deliberative local
government. 6° These critiques attack exactions as inefficient because they
use bargains that manifested excessive agency capture or corruption. See Judith Welch Wegner,
Moving Toward the Bargaining Table: Contract Zoning, Development Agreements, and the Theoretical
Foundations of Government Land Use Deals, 65 N.C. L. REV. 957,977-94 (1987).
55. See, e.g., ALTSHULER & GoMEZ-I ,A EZ, supra note 30, at 107, 135.
56. See Arthur C. Nelson, Development Impact Fees: The Next Generation, in EXACrnONS, IMPACT
FEES AND DEDICATIONS 87, 93-94 (Robert H. Freilich & David W. Bushek eds., 1995).
57. See Reynolds & Ball, supra note 52, at 458-59.
58. See id. at 456.
59. See Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 35-45 (1998). In this respect, criticism
of the putatively unbiased efforts to impose cost-benefit analysis on environmental law applies to
exactions as well. See David M. Driesen, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Neutral?, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 335,
384-85 (2006) (finding that the use of putatively "neutral" cost-benefit analysis in environmental
regulation can in fact demonstrate significant anti-regulatory bias).
6o. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS 104 (1985) (advocating strict application of Takings Clause
because without compensation requirement, regulation of property inevitably leads to government
rent-seeking behavior); Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 7o6-i i, 761-79 (1973) (identifying "fundamental
weaknesses" in zoning, and proposing development of a "more privatized system of land use
regulation"); Robert H. Nelson, Privatizing the Neighborhood: A Proposal to Replace Zoning with
Private Collective Property Rights to Existing Neighborhoods, in THE VOLUNTARY CITY: CHOICE,
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not only add to the cost of housing, but also force development to
outlying suburbs and exurbs that impose fewer regulations, thereby
creating "leapfrog" development and sprawl. 6' Critics also condemn
exactions as an extortionate tool in an already burdensome land use
planning process that results in a regulatory program that enables local
governments to withhold valuable entitlements from individual
developers and property owners unless the latter groups are willing to
"exchange" outrageous and unfair fees or demands for the dedication of
land.62 This extortion, in turn, makes new development more expensive
and thereby harms outsiders who are excluded from economically and
racially homogenous suburbs by high home prices.63 Viewed this way,
exactions cause more problems than they solve.
Of course, such complaints about exactions' effectiveness, fairness,
and efficiency can apply to any regulatory device employed by any
regulatory agency, and even more so with respect to any particular tool
of land use regulation. 6' It is also unclear as a predictive matter precisely
how exactions' flaws play out on the regulatory ground. Indeed, it is
unclear whether imperfect information, high administrative costs,
political and legal limits on local authority, inexpert or corrupt regulatory
practices, and unfair and exclusionary decision-making lead, in any
particular case, to more or less regulation than the hypothetical ideal of

COMMUNITY, AND CIVIL SOcIETY 307, 353-56 (David T. Beito et al. eds., 2002) (calling for privatization

of zoning functions within neighborhood associations as a means to dismantle the coercive legacy of
planning and land use controls).
6L See FISCHEL, supra note 36, at 229-31 (noting that developers' preference for underdeveloped
and under-regulated land and homeowners' preference for low-density zoning lead to sprawl and
"leapfrog" development).
62. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (characterizing an exaction that
is unrelated to the harms likely to be caused by a proposed developed constitute "an out-and-out plan
of extortion" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); see also Carlos A. Ball & Laurie
Reynolds, Exactions and Burden Distribution in Takings Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1513, 1556-57

(2006) (arguing that exactions frequently require newcomers to pay for services and infrastructure that
existing residents had received for free); Sterk, supra note 49, at 1744-47 (arguing that exactions lead
to governmental rent seeking).
63. See, e.g., Mark Edward Braun, Suburban Sprawl in Southeastern Wisconsin: Planning,Politics,
and the Lack of Affordable Housing, in SUBURBAN SPRAWL: CULTURE, THEORY, AND POLmCS 265

(Matthew J. Lindstrom & Hugh Battling eds., 2003) (arguing that impact fees contribute to residential
class segregation). But see Been, supra note 34, at 146-47 (citing efforts to study whether growth
management and impact fees are intended to cause, or in fact cause, exclusion of low-income or
minority consumers, but finding mixed evidence).
64. As the editors of an administrative law casebook cogently demonstrate, generalized critiques
of any regulatory agency-as well as of any substantive law or regulations they promulgatefrequently proceed at a high level of abstraction, proceed from the critics' sympathy or hostility to the
agency's substantive efforts, and tend to whipsaw an agency by condemning it from both sides at once
(such as by complaining both that it is subject to capture by regulated parties and insufficiently
responsive to the needs of regulated parties). See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE
AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 30-32 (5th ed. 2003). Local governmental efforts to regulate land use

and their use of exactions face the same fate.
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the "perfect" exaction. 65 But these flaws certainly make it less likely that
something approaching regulatory perfection can ever be achieved.
These criticisms suggest three alternative responses. First, when
encompassed within a general, libertarian dismissal of local land use
regulation, a critique of exactions as inefficient and extortionate counsels
a complete dismantling of local planning, insofar as all of exactions'
regulatory imperfections and unfairness are symptomatic of the broader
impossibility and failure of planning as a governmental project. 6 Prohibit
planning, in other words, and exactions-and the problems they causewill no longer exist. A second response suggests that local governments
can retain the authority to engage in planning and land use regulation67
but should not have the authority to impose conditions on approvals.
Planning is not the problem; it is the discretionary authority to grant
conditional approvals and to exact money and land that perverts an
otherwise effective regulatory process. A third response asserts that a
proper and effective land use planning regime would channel
discretionary authority to impose exactions toward particular types of
defensible, fair conditions imposed through fair procedures. 6 Exactions
are indeed imperfect, but they are superior to an inflexible growthcontrol system. Some external authority, preferably a higher level of
government such as state legislatures or the federal or state judiciary, can
effectively police local governments that have the authority to impose
exactions.
The first alternative, which would prohibit planning entirely, will not
occur in the short term, given the political popularity of land use
regulation and the longstanding existence of the legal authority to engage
in it. This is especially true after the failure of property rights advocates
to curtail that authority through their concerted effort to develop a
powerful regulatory takings doctrine. 69 The second alternative, which
65. See generally Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Administrative
Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 166-68 (1998) (arguing that general theories of regulation fail to explain
satisfactorily the "facts-on-the-ground" of regulation).
66. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING wrrH THE STATE I8I (1993).
67. The closest the Court has come to indicating a disapproval of exactions as a practice appeared
in a footnote in Nollan in which Justice Scalia characterized unrelated exactions as a means by which
local governments can play with their land use regulations to maximize the rents they seek from
property owners. See 483 U.S. at 837 n.5. This position could lead to the conclusion that any ability to
bargain with property owners using police powers constitutes an excess of authority. Indeed, a similar
concern drove the brief flurry of state cases that struck down land use bargains as "contract zoning"
because courts feared that the bargaining away of police powers would lead to poor land use planning
and corruption. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
68. See ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBA&EZ, supranote 3 o , at 136-39.
69. This failure has been widely noted on the right and left. See Eric R. Claeys, Takings and
Private Property on the Rehnquist Court, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 187, 188-89 (2004) (expressing a
conservative natural property rights advocate's profound disappointment with the Rehnquist Court's
efforts to expand property rights); Joseph L. Sax, Property Rights and the Economy of Nature:
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would prohibit or severely curtail exactions, is equally unlikely to occur.
At this point in the history of planning, exactions are too widely used and
too important to the operation of land use controls to be prohibited.
They play a crucial regulatory and ideological role in bringing flexibility
to an otherwise inflexible process, ameliorating the negative
consequences of controversial new development proposals while
persuading political opposition to accept them."° The third alternativeto limit and channel discretion and to correct instances in which the
discretion is abused or in which exactions produce unacceptably adverse
consequences-has been, and will continue to be, the focus of efforts to
manage exactions. This was the alternative chosen by the Supreme Court
in Nollan and Dolan.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF EXACTIONS PRE-2005:
NOLLAN AND DOLAN

A.

NOLLAN AND DOLAN

Nollan and Dolan upheld exactions as a general proposition while
raising the baseline of protection in states where legislatures and courts
had previously deferred to local governmental authority. These decisions
concerned property owners' federal constitutional challenges to similar
exactions and resulted in two related tests. In each case, a single property
owner (in neither case a developer) sought a discretionary approval from
a local or regional agency to expand the use of their property.7' In each
case, the agency granted the approval on the condition that the property
owner open parts of their land to the public to offset the expected harms
that the expanded uses would cause.7"
The exaction in Nollan required petitioners, who sought to replace a
dilapidated beach bungalow with a larger house, to dedicate an easement
across their beachfront.73 The easement would join a network of lateral
easements across private sections of the beach, enabling the public to
walk to a public beach a short distance away.74 The California Coastal
Commission, which has jurisdiction over development in the coastal area
and had imposed the condition, sought the easement in order to offset
the adverse impacts the house would have on the public's visual access to
the beach.7" The Supreme Court held that the easement was
Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN. L. REv. 1433, 1437-38 (1993)
(noting, from the perspective of a liberal environmentalist, the limits of the Rehnquist Court's efforts
to reconstruct property and takings law).
70. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW's LIMrrs Iio-Il (2OO1).
7. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,379 (994); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
72. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 381-82; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828.
73. 483 U.S. at 828.
74- Id.
75. Id.
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constitutionally excessive as an exaction because the easement was
insufficiently connected to the harm that the Commission sought to
address in imposing it.76 The Court stated that the Constitution requires
an "essential nexus" between a condition imposed by the government
and the government objective that the condition is intended to advance."
Visual access, the Commission's stated objective, had virtually no nexus
to the easement and therefore represented a drastic incursion on the
owners' right to exclude the public from their property. 8
The Court reached its conclusion in this manner: Had the
Commission simply taken the easement from the Nollans, the Takings
Clause would have required that the Nollans be compensated.79 But so
long as the Commission imposed an exaction that was clearly related to
its police power authority and to the permissible objectives it hoped to
achieve under that authority, no compensation would be required. 8 In
other words, local police power can impose exactions that pursue a
legitimate objective. Under those circumstances, the Takings Clause does
not require compensation for a regulatory act with an essential nexus to
that objective that otherwise results in a taking of property. The Takings
Clause does not, however, allow local governments to extort private
property-by requiring exactions that either lack, or are unrelated to, a
legitimate purpose-unless the property owner is compensated." ' The
Commission's exaction in Nollan required compensation not simply
because it took an essential property right from the Nollans (the right to
exclude the public), but because it used the Commission's police power
authority to take the property without demonstrating that the taking had
an essential nexus
to the Commission's actual objectives in exercising
thatthat
authority. 882
While Nollan concerned the qualitative nexus between an exaction
and the government's regulatory purpose, Dolan considered the
quantitative proportionality between an exaction and the harms that the
city of Tigard, Oregon sought to mitigate by imposing the exaction. 83 In
Dolan, the property owner sought permits in order to expand her
hardware store and the store's parking lot." The city conditioned
issuance of its permits on the property owner's dedication to the public
of both an undeveloped part of her land for a floodplain and an

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
8i.

Id. at 838-39.
Id. at 837.
Id. at 838.
Id. at 841-42.
Id. at 84 1.
Id. at 837.
82. See id. at 838.
83. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,377 (994).
84. Id. at 379.

March

2007]

REGULATING LAND USE

easement across her land for a bicycle path.8' As in Nollan, the city of
Tigard would have been required to pay compensation if it had simply
taken the land and easement for the bike path and floodplain. But these
exactions met Nollan's qualitative nexus test because flooding and traffic
constitute legitimate police power concerns."" In theory, the bike path
would have served as part of a network of bike routes the city was
piecing together and would have offset the anticipated increase in traffic
from the store expansion.8 The floodplain would offset the increase in
impermeable surfaces on the owner's land from the expanded structures
and pavement, which would create additional flooding on her property. 88
Nevertheless, the Court held that these exactions required
compensation because they required too much from the property
owner."' In the Court's words, they lacked "rough proportionality" both
"in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development."' The
Court found that the city had failed to meet its burden of demonstrating
that these dedications were quantitatively necessary to mitigate the
harms expected to result from the property's expanded use.9' The
floodplain did not need to be dedicated to the public in order to retain
storm water, and the Court was unconvinced that dedication of the bike
path was required to mitigate the anticipated increase in automobile
traffic to and from the hardware store.9" Dolan's rough proportionality
test thus took its place alongside Nollan's essential nexus test in the
pantheon of regulatory takings tests.
B.

UNCERTAINTY AND VARIABILITY AFTER NOLLAN AND DOLAN

If the Court-or at least the justices who constituted the slim
majorities in Nollan and Dolan 3-considered its constitutional tests for
exactions to be clear, authoritative, and likely to contain administrative
discretion in imposing exactions, it was sorely mistaken. Prior to the
Court's oblique return to the exactions issue in its 2004 Term, four
members of the Dolan majority had poured their frustrations over
Nollan and Dolan's failure to constrain land use regulation into dissents
85. Id. at 379-80.

86. Id. at 387.
87. Id. at 387-88.
88. Id. at 382.
89.
90.
9i.
92.

Id. at 391.

Id.
Id. at 394-95.
Id. at 393-94.
93. Chief Justice Rehnquist's decision in Dolan was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 376. Justice Scalia's Nollan decision was joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White, Powell, and O'Connor. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825,
826 (1987). All five members of the Dolan majority were still on the Court for the 2005 takings
decisions. See SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/members.pdf (last visited Mar. i, 2007).
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from denials of certiorari in two cases. In one, Justice Scalia, joined by
two of his colleagues, accused local governments and lower courts of
willfully ignoring Supreme Court precedent.' 4 Whether the fault lay in
the local political branches for refusing to respect federal constitutional
limits on their discretion, or in federal and state judicial actors for failing
to enforce those limits, or in the exactions decisions themselves, the
decade between Dolan and the 2004 Term saw significant uncertainty
among courts and litigants over how to identify the types of exactions to
which heightened scrutiny applies.95
One significant source of confusion, caused by the Court itself, has
been the reach of the nexus and proportionality tests, an unresolved issue
that created two questions the Court had failed to address directly before
its 2004 Term. First, do the nexus and proportionality requirements apply
only to exactions that require the dedication of land for public use (as in
the facts of Nollan and Dolan themselves), or do they extend to
exactions such as impact fees or conservation easements that do not
require the property owner to forfeit the right to exclude? 96 Nollan and
Dolan included language indicating that the land/non-land distinction
made a constitutional difference,' but many lower courts had not
considered the decisions to be limited to their narrow facts. 98 Second, do
Nollan and Dolan apply only to adjudicative decisions imposing
exactions on an individual piece of land, or do they also extend to
legislative decisions imposing equivalent exactions on all development
within an entire jurisdiction or larger units thereof? On this question, the
Court had indicated prior to its 2004 Term that only individualized
exactions fall within the special context of exactions.' But again, lower
94. See Lambert v. City and County of San Francisco, 529 U.S. 1045, 1049 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (joined by Justices Thomas and Kennedy); cf.Parking Ass'n v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S.
i 16, 1116 (995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (joined by Justice O'Connor, arguing that Nollan and Dolan
should apply to legislatively imposed exactions as well as individualized exactions).
95. See Richard A. Epstein, The Harms and Benefits of Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REv.
477, 492 (1995) (criticizing lower courts' dislike of Nollan); Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Non-Impact of
the United States Supreme Court Regulatory Takings Cases on the State Courts: Does the Supreme
Court Really Matter?, 6 FORDHAM ENV rL. L.J. 523, 555-56 (1995) (documenting lower courts' record of

failing to enforce Supreme Court takings decisions, including Nollan and Dolan).
96. See Nancy E. Stroud, A Review of Del Monte Dunes v. City of Monterey and Its Implications
for Local Government Exactions, 15 J.LAND USE & ENVrL. L. 195, 203-05 (1999).

97. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (distinguishing Dolan, in which the challenged exaction required
the property owner to dedicate part of her land to the city, from other regulatory takings cases
applying different standards of review, in which the challenged regulations imposed conditions that
were "simply a limitation on the use" the property owners made of their land); Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841
(noting that required dedications demand more careful judicial review because of the "heightened risk
that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power
objective").
98. See Stroud, supra note 96, at 202-06 (discussing the split among courts on this point and
possible implications of Del Monte Dunes).

99. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385 (distinguishing between challenges to "essentially legislative
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courts have not considered themselves bound by the Court's language,"
and a sizeable minority of courts, with the support of some Supreme
Court justices and commentators, has applied the nexus and
proportionality tests to legislative exactions.' The Court had produced
tea leaves sufficient to provoke speculation as to how it would settle the
land/ non-land issue as recently as City of Monterey v. Del Monte
Dunes,"2 but it had not settled either issue authoritatively by the time it
decided Lingle-at least in part because the tea leaves it had produced
five years earlier hinted in the opposite direction. 3
C.

THE IMPERFECTIONS OF NOLLAN AND DOLAN

While a number of commentators have praised Nollan and Dolan,
disappointed only that the Court has not extended their tests more
broadly, 4 critics have complained of the decisions' conceptual,
normative, descriptive, and consequential flaws. 5 Indeed, the decisions

determinations classifying entire areas of the city," and the challenges reviewed in Dolan (and, by
implication, Nollan), which were challenges to "adjudicative decision[s] to condition petitioner's
application for a building permit on an individual parcel"); see also id. at 391 n.8 (noting that judicial
review of "an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner's application for a building permit on an
individual parcel" applies heightened scrutiny and places the burden on the government entity to
prove that an exaction does not effect a taking, as opposed to judicial review of "generally applicable
zoning regulations," which proceeds under a more relaxed scrutiny with the burden on the property
owner to demonstrate that the exaction constitutes a taking).
ioo. See Fenster, supra note to, at 639 n.I44 (citing cases).
iot. See, e.g., Parking Ass'n of Georgia v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. si16 (t995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (attacking the legislative/adjudicative distinction as unclear, illogical, and essentially
meaningless); Laurie Reynolds, Local Subdivision Regulation: Formulaic Constraints in an Age of
Discretion, 24 GA. L. REv. 525, 544-49 (1990) (arguing that the legislative/adjudicative distinction is
meaningless in the local context where governments are smaller and their structures less formal); Inna
Reznik, Note, The Distinction Between Legislative and Adjudicative Decisions in Dolan v. City of
Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 26o-6i (2000).
102. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702 (1999) (stating
that the exactions rules apply only to those conditions for approval that require "the dedication of
property to public use").
io3. On the next business day after it issued its decision in Dolan, the Court directed the
California Supreme Court to review, in light of Dolan, a California Court of Appeal decision that had
applied a relatively low standard of review to impact fee exactions. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 512
U.S. 1231, 1231-32 (1994). The California Supreme Court, in turn, applied Nollan and Dolan to the
exaction. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429,433 (Cal. 1996) (plurality opinion).
Io4. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 934, 963-64 (2003) (arguing in favor of extending Nollan and Dolan's heightened means-ends test
for "public use" inquiries in eminent domain litigation); Douglas W. Kmiec, Inserting the Last
Remaining Pieces into the Takings Puzzle, 38 Wm.& MARY L. REV. 995, 1044-45 (1997) (arguing in
favor of the nexus and proportionality tests' general applicability for all land-use takings cases); Jan G.
Laitos, Causationand the UnconstitutionalConditions Doctrine: Why the City of Tigard's Exaction Was
a Taking, 72 DENV.U. L. REV. 893, 904-08 (I995) (arguing that the exactions decisions signaled that
the Court was imposing a generalized "causation" test under the Takings Clause that would require
compensation for any regulation that performs more than narrowly forced cost-internalization on a
land use's negative externalities).
io 5 . See supra note 29 (listing commentaries critical of Nollan and Dolan).
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are by no means perfect. They simplify the local political, regulatory, and
market contexts for imposing exactions, and fail to recognize the
institutions that check local governmental discretion. 1°6 When read
broadly, the decisions assume that property owners are universally
vulnerable to extortion by local governments and require broad
protection against unconstitutional confiscations. Part IV of this Article
describes the context that the Court's caricature ignores as an
institutional web within which land use regulation operates; suffice it to
say here that the Court's assumptions are overly simplistic.
The Court's failure to consider context and complexity in the local
land use regulatory process led it to fashion prophylactic, formalistic
rules in its nexus and proportionality tests' °7 that operate in isolation
from more relevant inquiries that would better focus on the extent to
which an exaction unfairly took property from an individual. In the
continuum of regulatory takings tests, the proportionality and nexus tests
are closer to the mechanical rule for a permanent physical invasion
(which always requires compensation) than to the indeterminate and
multi-factor Penn Central balancing test."' By definition, mechanical
rules narrow the scope and sharpen the edge of judicial inquiry into
complex regulatory transactions. These rules then narrow the exercise of
administrative discretion when a regulatory agency, fearing the
possibility of litigation and the application of those mechanical rules to
its regulatory decisions, follows the rule rather than its own conclusions
regarding the wisest regulatory course."'
Because the Court misunderstood or ignored the regulatory field on
which its exactions rules apply and failed to make clear when these rules
apply, Nollan and Dolan have produced a number of unanticipated
consequences -many of which adversely affect the rights of property
owners as well as the discretion of government planning."' In some
jurisdictions, the Court's protections and other pressures have helped
contribute to instances in which local governments have placed minimal
or no conditions on approvals for fear of exposing themselves to costly
io6. See Dana, supra note 29, at 1271-74; Carol M. Rose, Takings, Federalism,Norms, 1O5 YALE
L.J. 1121, 1131-39 (996) (reviewing FISCHEL, supranote 29).
107. See Rossi, supra note Io, at IO7-O8 (praising formalism in Nollan and Dolan).
xo8. See Fenster, supra note iO, at 629.
io9. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING

BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULEBASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 145-49 (I991) (describing how rules narrow the focus of

decision-makers to limited set of concerns); Thomas W. Merrill, The Mead Doctrine: Rules and
Standards,Meta-Rules and Meta-Standards,54 ADMIN. L. REV. 807, 822-23 (2002) (describing how the
choice of rules or standards for the standard of judicial review of agency action affects agency
behavior); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1179 (989)
(arguing that clear rules offer the advantages of uniform interpretation and predictable
implementation).
iio. The paragraphs that follow summarize arguments and data presented in Fenster, supra note
i0, at 652-68.
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litigation, thereby enabling new development to push its costs onto
existing residents. But in jurisdictions that strongly support growth
controls and enjoy a booming real estate market, local regulators have
successfully avoided the Court's constitutional commands and imposed
exactions that were unrelated or arguably disproportionate to a
development project's harms. " '
Furthermore, by limiting the type as well as the extent of exactions,
Nollan and Dolan limit the universe of potential bargains and conditions
that might effectively persuade local opposition to a proposed projectthereby limiting the freedom of property owners to trade property rights
for regulatory entitlements and making it more likely that a local
government will deny a project rather than bargain to a mutually
acceptable exaction."2 That is, Dolan by itself might provide sufficient
protection for a property owner through its proportionality requirement.
But Nollan can narrow the range of local government discretion,
sometimes to the detriment of the property owner. For example, if a
jurisdiction would prefer some condition, the cost of which would be
proportional to the anticipated harm but which lacks an "essential
nexus" to the harm, it may turn down a project for fear of takings
liability under Nollan.

iiI. This can occur in two ways. First, in overheated real estate markets local governments can
simply not comply with Nollan and Dolan by dealing only with repeat-playing developers who are
willing to suffer excessive exactions because of the profit margins of their proposed developments. See
Dana, supra note 29, at 1286-94; Fenster, supra note io, at 666-68.
Second, local governments can utilize regulatory tools to which Nollan and Dolan may not
apply. For example, local governments can obtain exactions that might otherwise fail under Notlan
and Dolan through development agreements authorized in some states by statute whereby the
municipality agrees to freeze the regulatory requirements that will be applied to a development in
exchange for the developer's agreement to meet enumerated conditions (which may include the
dedication of land). See DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW § 6.23 (5th ed. 2003). Although such
agreements would thereby impose a per se taking through an individualized exaction, proponents of
development agreements argue that because they are voluntary, bilateral contracts, they should not be
subject to nexus and proportionality tests under the Takings Clause. See David L. Callies & Julie A.
Tappendorf, Unconstitutional Land Development Conditions and the Development Agreement
Solution: Bargainingfor Public FacilitiesAfter Nollan and Dolan, 51 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663,692-93
(2001); Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., & Sanford M. Skaggs, Legal Issues and Considerations,in DEVELOPMENT
AGREEMENTS: PRACTICE, POLICY, AND PROSPECTS 121, 130-31 (Douglas R. Porter & Lindell L. Marsh
eds., 1989); Patricia Grace Hammes, Development Agreements: The Intersection of Real Estate Finance
and Land Use Controls, 23 U. BALT. L. REV. 119, 158-59 (1995). But see Michael H. Crew,
Development Agreements After Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 22 URB. LAW. 23, 50-55 (199O)
(arguing that development agreements should be subject to Nollan); Wegner, supra note 54, at iooo
(arguing that development agreements are regulatory, rather than contractual). Similar issues arise
when exactions are required as part of annexation agreements. See Peggy L. Cuciti, Exactions through
Annexation Agreements: A Case Study, in PRIVATE SUPPLY OF PUBLIC SERVICES, supra note 53, at 23844112. FISCHEL, supra note 29, at 348-49; Been, supra note 29, at 497; Fennell, supra note 14, at 50;
Jerold S. Kayden, Zoning for Dollars: New Rules for an Old Game? Comments on the Municipal Art
Society and Nollan Cases, 39 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 48 (199i).
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At the same time, in an effort both to regularize their exactions
practice and to take advantage of the presumption that Nollan and
Dolan do not apply either to legislated or non-possessory exactions,
many local governments have adopted legislative, formulaic impact fees
and relied more heavily on conditions requiring the payment of those
fees than on the dedication of real property."3 Using this practice, local
governments have pursued a more mechanical, less discretionary
approach to land use regulation and have foregone more open-ended
negotiations over a wider universe of possible exactions. This practice
also potentially limits the ability of property owners to negotiate an
individualized exaction that would be more advantageous and attractive
to both parties.
These criticisms concern the decisions' conceptual and consequential
failings. But the formalistic tests in Nollan and Dolan also appear to
disregard important considerations that are typically part of regulatory
takings inquiries. They ignore, or at least minimize the significance of,
the fundamental Armstrong principle of regulatory takings," 4 which asks
whether burdens are spread fairly throughout the community."' It is
possible, for example, for a permissible exaction under Nollan and Dolan
to impose a burden on a property owner that was not imposed on others;
it is also possible for an unconstitutional exaction to be widely imposed
on others in the community. ' ' 6 Thus, nexus and proportionality do not
help identify instances in which a property owner has been unfairly
singled out for a burdensome exaction." ' Nor do they help courts identify
when a property owner who is subject to an exaction also gains a
reciprocal advantage from the imposition of exactions on other, similarly
situated, members of the community." 8 In Nollan and Dolan, for
"

113. See generally James C. Nicholas, Designing Proportionate-ShareImpact Fees, in PRIVATE
SUPPLY OF PUBLIC SERVICES 127, 130-34 (advocating use of formulaic fees that would survive judicial
review); Reynolds & Ball, supra note 52, at 465-69.
114. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (I96o) (declaring that the Takings Clause was
"designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear burdens which, in all fairness
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole").
ii 5 . See Ball & Reynolds, supra note 62, at 1547-53.
116. Indeed, the facts of Nollan indicate that this occurred with the lateral beach easement in that
case. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comn'n, 483 U.S. 825, 829 (1987) (noting that forty-three out of sixty
coastal development permits along the same tract of land had included identical beach easements to
those challenged in Nollan, and that of the remaining seventeen properties, fourteen permits had been
issued before the Commission had issued regulations enabling it to impose a condition, and the
remaining three did not have oceanfront property).
117. See D.S. Pensley, Note, Real Cities, Ideal Cities: Proposing a Test of Intrinsic Fairness for
Contested Development Exactions, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 699, 722-31 (20O6) (incorporating from
corporate law an "intrinsic fairness" test that would closely consider process and burden issues in
individual cases).
I18. Justice Holmes originally suggested the "reciprocity of advantage" inquiry in Penn. Coal Co.
v. Mahon, 26o U.S. 393, 415 (1922). It has more recently been relied upon in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 341 (noting reciprocal advantages to
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example, the property owners would have benefited from the positive
network effects of lateral beach easements and bike path easements that
the government agencies were attempting to piece together."'
In short, the Court's exactions decisions failed to provide an
effective constitutional approach to exactions. Instead, they established
overly simple rules that are inconsistent with at least some aspects of the
Court's regulatory takings doctrine-rules whose application is unclear
and whose consequences are significantly less than perfect. These
imperfections and uncertainties were the legal context within which
exactions returned to the Court, albeit obliquely, in Lingle v. Chevron.
III. EXACTIONS,

VERSION 2005: LINGLE,
SAN REMO HOTEL, AND THE 2004 TERM

The Court granted petitions for certiorari in three takings cases for
its 2004 Term, two of which concerned regulatory takings claims. 20 But
the Court avoided explicit reconsideration of its exactions jurisprudence
in the case that involved an exaction,'"' even as it restated its exactions
rules in the other decision which did not concern an exaction. '2
A.

SAN

REMO

HOTEL: TAKINGS PROCEDURE OVER EXACTIONS SUBSTANCE

One of the three takings cases for which certiorari was granted in the
2004 Term actually concerned a challenge to an exaction. The petition
for certiorari filed by the plaintiffs in San Remo Hotel v. City and County
of San Francisco presented two questions.'23 The second raised a
substantive issue concerning the applicability of Nollan and Dolan to
exactions that are imposed through legislation rather than through more
specific, individualized administrative processes." 4 The substantive issue
arose from the hotel owners' challenge to a $567,000 fee that San
Francisco charged under its Hotel Conversion Ordinance for converting

all property owners from temporary moratorium), and in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 491 (1987) (citing reciprocal advantages as a rationale for upholding state
statute against a regulatory takings challenge because some of the statute's benefits are likely to
redound to property owner).
ii9. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 856 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Ball & Reynolds, supra note 62, at 155459 (identifying the "reciprocity of advantage" enjoyed by property owners in the exactions challenged
in Nollan and Dolan).
120. The third takings decision famously considered the Public Use Clause of the Fifth
Amendment's Takings Clause. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 455 (2005) (holding that
the "public use" requirement for exercise of eminent domain under the Fifth Amendment did not bar
city's exercise of eminent domain power in furtherance of an economic development plan that would
result in acquired property's use for private development).
121. See infra Part.llI.A.
122. See infra Part III.B.
123. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San
Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005) (No. 04-340).
124. See id.
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rooms in their hotel from residential to tourist use.'25 The fee constituted
a required, in-lieu contribution to the city's effort to provide affordable
housing, and was intended to mitigate the impact that the loss of
residential hotel units, which serve as housing predominantly for the
poor, elderly, and disabled, would have on the city's diminishing supply
of affordable housing. 2 6 The California Supreme Court, following Nollan
and Dolan and its own precedent, held that the Supreme Court's
heightened nexus and proportionality requirements did not apply to the
challenged fee because the housing replacement fee was based upon a
statutorily created formula that was applied mechanically to the
plaintiff's proposed conversion.'27 Instead, the California Supreme Court
held, a more relaxed, "reasonable relationship" test applied, under which
the fee survived both facial and as-applied challenges.
The substantive appeal thus raised one of the key issues left open in
the Court's exactions decisions and strenuously debated by lower courts
and commentators in the intervening years: whether an exaction imposed
by legislation rather than by individualized adjudication should be
scrutinized under Nollan and Dolan or under some lower standard
developed by state courts. 9 But the Court granted certiorari only to
consider the other question raised in the San Remo Hotel petition, which
concerned issue preclusion in federal court when a state court had
previously adjudicated a takings claim under state constitutional law.'30
The Court's decision in San Remo Hotel-holding that under the full
faith and credit statute,'' a plaintiff whose federal regulatory takings
claim is resolved by a state court under state takings law is precluded
from re-litigating the claim in federal court3' - only resolved the
procedural and jurisdictional question and did not consider any
substantive issues relating to exactions.
B.

LINGLE AND EXAcTIONS

In the meantime, the Court had granted certiorari to another

125.

See San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87,95 (Cal.

2002).

126. See id. at 91-92.
127. See id. at 104-O5 (relying on Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 951 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996), as well as
on Nollan and Dolan).

128. See id. at 1O5-ii.
129. Theoretically, the case could have raised the other open issue-whether heightened scrutiny
applies to monetary exactions. See supra text accompanying notes 96-98. However, the California
Supreme Court had settled that issue in its Ehrlich decision, and the issue was not raised in the U.S.
Supreme Court. See Ehrlich, 911 P.2d at 433 (plurality opinion) (holding that Nollan and Dolan apply
to an individualized monetary exaction).
530. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 543 U.S. 5032, 1032 (2004)
(granting petition for certiorari as to only one question).
131.
132.

U.S.C. § 1738 (2ooo).
San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
28
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regulatory takings case out of the Ninth Circuit, Lingle v. Chevron.'33
Lingle concerned the viability under the Takings Clause of a test
originally articulated in the Court's 198o decision in Agins v. City of
Tiburon, which considered whether a regulation challenged under the
Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause "substantially advance[s] [a]
legitimate state interest. '""' Under Agins, this test could stand alone as a
basis for takings liability.'35 The unanimous decision in Lingle, however,
held that the "substantially advances" test is appropriate only as the basis
of a substantive due process claim and is unsuitable for adjudication of a
takings claim. 36 In the process, the Court offered a comprehensive
review of the Court's takings jurisprudence closing with a fairly extensive
discussion of its exactions decisions, in order to explain that Nollan and
Dolan neither overlapped with nor depended upon the rejected test from
Agins.'37
The Issue and Result in Lingle
i.
In Lingle, the Supreme Court considered an appeal by Hawaii to an
adverse takings judgment requiring gas companies to be compensated for
the losses they suffered from a legislative cap on the amount of rent that
they could charge dealers to whom they leased their gas stations.' The
legislation was enacted in order to address concerns about the price
effects of market concentration in retail gasoline sales in the state.'39 The
federal district court had applied the "substantially advances" test from
Agins without considering the extent of the harm to the gas companies'
property rights, and it had inquired extensively into the purpose, wisdom,
and likelihood of success of a legislative enactment. 4 ' The Ninth Circuit
affirmed both the lower court's use of Agins and its judgment. 4 '
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the "substantially
advances" test did not belong within the limited range of inquiries
authorized by the Takings Clause.'42 These inquiries include, most
133. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 363 F.3d 846 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 543 U.S. 924 (2004).
134. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 531-33 (2005).
135. See Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (i98o).
136. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543-46.

137. See id. at 545-48. The exactions discussion comprised most of Part III of the Lingle decision.
See id.

138. For more thorough descriptions of Lingle and its place within the Court's regulatory takings
doctrine, see generally D. Benjamin Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The Potential Long-Term Impact of
Lingle v. Chevron and the Separation of Takings and Substantive Due Process, 69 ALB. L. REV. 343
(2005); Robert G. Dreher, Lingle's Legacy: Untangling Substantive Due Process from Takings
Doctrine, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 371 (2oo6); Fenster, supra note 25; Joseph William Singer, The
Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, and Just Obligations, 30 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 309,327-29 (2oo6).
139. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 533.
140. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1192 (D. Haw. 2002).
141. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 363 F.3d 846,852 (9th Cir. 2004).
142. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 532.
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prominently, tests that identify whether a regulation results in a
"functional equivalent" to the exercise of the eminent domain powereither by imposing a permanent physical invasion of private property or
by diminishing entirely the property's economic value, "3 or by creating a
lesser burden that nevertheless requires compensation under a multifactor balancing test that considers, among other things, the extent of the
diminution in the property's value and the frustration of the owner's
reasonable investment-backed expectations.'" The Agins test, by
contrast, had allowed a property owner to allege that a regulatory act
effected a taking solely on the basis of the character of the government's
action, without reference to whether the act had any effect on the use or
value of his property. 45 Furthermore, the "substantially advances" test,
especially as applied without reference to the regulation's effect on the
owner's property, invited courts to scrutinize the purpose, wisdom, and
functionality of a regulatory act in an open-ended and potentially
rigorous way.' 46 None of the other tests within the pantheon of regulatory
takings jurisprudence makes such an inquiry-and, the Court declared,
none should. Lingle banished the
Agins test to the junkyard of
47
abandoned constitutional doctrine.
Lingle performed two additional tasks. First, it clarified the nature of
the regulatory takings inquiry. The Takings Clause, the Court
unanimously declared, protects property owners from the ends rather
than the means of a regulation.'14 Put another way, the regulatory takings
doctrine focuses only on effects and does not concern regulatory purpose
and method.'49 Second, in Lingle and other takings decisions from its

Term, the Court clarified its general approach to the Takings
Clause.'50 The Takings Clause does not authorize the judiciary to secondguess or engage in searching review of decisions made by competent
institutions whose authority to make those decisions has been long
settled. Instead, it empowers the judiciary to require compensation in
2004

143. Id. at 538-41 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426

(1982) (holding that permanent physical invasion of property effects a taking), and Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (holding that a regulation that denies an owner
"all economically beneficial use" of her land effects a taking)).
144 See id. (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-25 (1978)
(establishing default standard for takings claims that involves "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries"
into the challenged regulatory act and its effects).
145. See id. at 540-42.
146. See id. at 544-46
147. Cf. Bradley C. Karkkainen, The Police Power Revisited: Phantom Incorporationand the Roots
of the Takings "Muddle," 90 MINN. L. REv. 826, 883-84 (2o06) (arguing that Lingle provides only a
muddled, post hoc correction to the Court's greater historical error, made more than a century earlier:
holding that the Takings Clause had been incorporated within the Fourteenth Amendment).

148. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543.
149. See Barros, supra note 138, at 348.

i5o. See Singer, supra note 138, at 329.
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instances in which another institution has clearly or functionally
confiscated property. The Court has provided hard-edged, powerful rules
that apply a form of strict judicial scrutiny to address such instances. But
when those rules are not triggered, the judiciary as an institution must
defer to expert agencies that are overseen by elected branches of
government, to whom regulatory decisions are delegated by the federal
Constitution and state law.
2.

Exactions in Lingle

Lingle concerned an economic regulation, rather than an exaction.
But in providing an authoritative restatement of its regulatory takings
doctrine, the Court was forced to explain how Nollan and Dolan, as
regulatory takings decisions, fit within its newly articulated, general
approach to the Takings Clause. It did so in two ways, in a separate and
final Part III of the decision: by identifying the kinds of exactions which
the nexus and proportionality tests reach, and by offering a theoretical
and doctrinal justification for those tests in the takings context."' The
conditions that were challenged in Nollan and Dolan, the Court
were "adjudicative
land-use exactions-specifically,
explained,
government demands that a landowner dedicate an easement allowing
public access to her property as a condition of obtaining a development
permit.' 52 These factual predicates concern the substance (or "what")
and procedural posture (or "how") of the exactions to which the Court
applied its nexus and proportionality tests. The conditions in both cases
required the property owner to dedicate land, or some entitlement
relating to land (such as the right to exclude), rather than some other
property, such as money. As such, the exactions in Nollan and Dolan
constituted "per se" takings that would clearly have required
compensation but for the fact that they were part of a condition on
development.'53 The exactions also had been imposed individually,
through an "adjudicative" process, rather than through the application of
legislatively implemented, comprehensive sets of conditions required of
all or many similarly situated property owners.'54
151. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 545-48.
152. Id. at 546-47 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 379-80 (1994); Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 828 (1987)) (reiterating that in Dolan, the Court held that "an
adjudicative exaction requiring dedication of private property" faced the application of a rough
proportionality requirement (emphasis added)). In a parenthetical explaining how Del Monte Dunes
supported this limited reading of Nollan and Dolan's applicability, the Court noted that Del Monte
Dunes "emphasiz[ed] that we have not extended this standard 'beyond the special context of [such]
exactions."' Id. (quoting City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702
(1999)) (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 547-48154. See id. at 546-47 (characterizing both decisions as concerning "adjudicative land-use
exactions," and specifically describing Dolan's "rough proportionality" rule as applying to an
"adjudicative exaction").
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Lingle explained that the exactions rules protect property owners
from being forced to suffer a deprivation of property as a development
condition that would otherwise require compensation under the Takings
Clause. 5' As such, the decisions were based as much upon the
"unconstitutional conditions" doctrine as on the Takings Clause. I"6 But
Nollan and Dolan did not strictly apply that doctrine;5 7 rather, they
applied it as follows: A transaction that appears to violate the Takings
Clause may nevertheless be constitutionally permissible if the regulation
is within the government's police power authority and goes no further
than is necessary to accomplish a legitimate police power objective. An
exaction can only escape takings liability, however, if it relates both
qualitatively (i.e., with an "essential nexus") and quantitatively (i.e., in
"rough proportionality") to an important regulatory Furpose-mitigating
the development's expected negative consequences.
o
Lingle made plain that the nexus and proportionality tests anchor
judicial review to a limited set of questions, rather than enabling the
open-ended inquiry that the Agins test allowed.' 9 These questions are
both substantive and procedural. The Takings Clause aspect of the
exactions decisions protects an individual from a regulatory confiscation
of real property that would otherwise constitute a per se taking. Nollan
and Dolan are thus consistent with Lingle because they consider the
extent of the burden an individual property owner is being forced to
bear. The unconstitutional conditions doctrine aspect of the exactions
decisions recognizes that a development condition is unconstitutional if
the government unfairly takes advantage of its significant regulatory
leverage by singling out a property owner in the administrative process
and imposing a per se taking. The act of singling out a property owner
for an individualized regulation makes the condition more suspect.
Therefore, the application of heightened scrutiny only to such
individualized acts, and only when the exaction unquestionably would be
a taking if imposed directly, is consistent with Lingle's general
155. See id.

156. Id. at 547-48 (quoting Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385).
157. See DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 215-17 (2002) (concluding
that constitutional property rights appear to receive limited, though not insignificant, protection in the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
158. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547-48.
159. The Court did concede in Lingle, however, that one could have read both Nollan and Dolan
to be based in part on Agins, since the Court in both of its earlier decisions had cited the "substantially
advances" test as bases for the nexus and proportionality tests. See id. at 547; see also Dolan, 512 U.S.
at 385 (citing Agins and its "substantially advances a legitimate state interest" test); Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (same). Cf. Dwight H. Merriam & R. Jeffrey Lyman,
Dealing with Dolan, Practicallyand Jurisprudentially,in 1995 ZONING AND PLANNING HANDBOOK I I I,
126-27 (arguing that the unconstitutional conditions doctrine did not apply in Nollan because, unlike
in Dolan, the Coastal Commission was not granting a discretionary benefit by allowing the Nollans to
build their proposed house).
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disapproval of takings doctrines that allow rigorous judicial scrutiny of a
regulation's substantive wisdom. Exacting a per se taking through an
individualized process poses a greater risk of an unfair bargaining
process that will result in an undue burden falling on a property owner.
When that risk is highest, the nexus and proportionality tests apply.
The Court's reasoning in Lingle appears decidedly post hoc. Nollan
did not declare itself to be based upon the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine and cited no unconstitutional conditions precedent.' 6o Dolan's
discussion of the doctrine was thinI6 ' and included the absurd statement
that the doctrine is "well-settled," when constitutional scholars agree
only that it is as much of a mess as the regulatory takings doctrine. ' 62 The
signals Lingle sends regarding possessory exactions seem at least
consistent with an earlier signal, sent soon after Dolan, when the Court
vacated a California appellate court's decision regarding the application

of heightened scrutiny to fees.' 63 The Lingle decision will fail to persuade
commentators and courts seeking either fully coherent, formal
distinctions or expansive property rights. 6' But retroactive explanation
and conceptual closure are at the core of Lingle's project to explain
regulatory takings anyway, no matter the unsatisfactory nature, to some,
of the reasoning it employs to reach an explanatory closure. The
decision's power and authority arise from its ability to provide a coherent
restatement of what was long considered an incoherent, unsatisfactory
doctrine that expanded and contracted at the whims of a shifting Court
majority. Like the resolution of a complicated mystery, Lingle leaves
16o. Commentators have noted, however, that the doctrine was implicit in Nollan. See Been, supra
note 29, at 474; Thomas W. Merrill, Dolan v. City of Tigard: ConstitutionalRights as Public Goods, 72
DENV. U. L. REV. 859, 868-69 (1995) (characterizing as "mediocre" and "troubling" the majority
decision's effort to explain how and why it was extending the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to
the Takings Clause); Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1463
(I989).
161. See Fenster, supra note Io, at 633 n.i I6.
162. Compare Dolan, 512 U.S. at 385, with Sullivan, supra note 16o, at 1416 (describing judicial
application of unconstitutional conditions doctrine as "riven with inconsistencies"), and Seth F.
Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
1293, 1304 (1984) (complaining of inconsistent judicial application of the doctrine sufficient "to make a
legal realist of almost any reader"). Attempts to impose theoretical coherence on the doctrine have
failed to settle the field in the least. See generally Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines:
Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 9o GEo. L.J. I, 4-6 (2OOl) (summarizing earlier
attempts to explain the unconstitutional doctrine, noting their failures, and offering still another such
attempt).
163. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 512 U.S. 1231 (1994) (vacating and remanding, by a 5-4 vote,
Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1993), in which the state court refused to
apply exactions decisions to impact fee exactions).
164. See, e.g., Steven A. Haskins, Closing the Dolan Divide-Bridgingthe Legislative/Adjudicative
Divide, 38 Uma. LAW. 487, 519-21 (2oo6) (entirely ignoring Lingle's discussion of Nollan and Dolan,
except insofar as it reiterated the significance of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and
reiterating longstanding complaints about the legislative/adjudicative and real/personal property
distinctions).
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some loose ends untied. But if the Court's explanation of its exactions
cases arrived a bit late in the game and is not wholly persuasive, at least
the Court unanimously and confidently offered an explanation that
appears comprehensible, cohesive, and relatively inconsistent with its
other regulatory takings decisions.
3. Lingle, Exactions, and Precedent
But should and will Lingle's discussion of the exactions decisions,
and specifically its description of Nollan and Dolan as limited to the
factual circumstances of adjudicated conditions requiring the owners to
dedicate land, have sufficient precedential value to resolve for lower
courts the unsettled issues in the exactions decisions? The Court's entire
discussion of Nollan and Dolan in Lingle was, in a sense, beside the point
of a case that concerned neither an exaction nor any of the legal rules
established in the exactions decisions. Theoretically, Lingle could have
been decided without any reference to exactions, and Justice O'Connor
could have left Part III, the section on exactions, entirely out of her
decision and still resolved the question before the Court. And in the Fall
2006 Term, the Court again denied a petition for certiorari that directly
raised these issues. 16' Accordingly, a state or lower federal court
considering a federal constitutional challenge to an exaction may attempt
to ignore as dicta the Court's statements limiting Nollan and Dolan-that
is, as unnecessary to the decision and therefore as having no precedential
value.' 66 Indeed, courts and commentators have used this reasoning
before in order to ignore
similar signals the Court sent six years earlier in
67
Del Monte Dunes.i
165. See City of Olympia v. Drebick, 127 S.Ct. 436 (2006).
166. See, e.g., Cohens v. Virginia, i9U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 399-400 (1821) ("[G]eneral expressions,
in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If
they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent
suit, when the very point is presented for decision."); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 749 (8th ed. 2004)
(defining "holding" as "[a] court's determination of a matter of law pivotal to its decision; a principle
drawn from such a decision"); id. at 1102 (defining "obiter dictum" as "[a] judicial comment made
while delivering a judicial opinion, but one that is unnecessary to the decision in the case and therefore
not precedential"); EUGENE WAMBAUGH, THE STUDY OF CASES 15 (2d ed. 1894) (the rule of decision is
"a proposition which strips away the unessential circumstances and declares a rule as to the essential

ones").
167. See Isla Verde Int'l Holdings, Inc. v. City of Camas, 990 P.2d 429, 437 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999),
affd, 49 P.3d 86o (Wash. 2002) (concluding that statements in Del Monte Dunes limiting Dolan to
exactions requiring dedications of land were dicta, and for that reason ignoring them); Bruce W.
Bringardner, Exactions, Impact Fees, and Dedications:National and Texas Law After Dolan and Del
Monte Dunes, 32 URB. LAW. 561, 582 (2000) (same).
Unsurprisingly, Lingle was not the first instance in which the Court has included what could
be classified as dicta in its takings decisions. Most recently, the Court's decision in Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002), concerned only
whether a temporary moratorium on development, which rendered property undevelopable,
constituted a per se temporary taking for which compensation was due under Lucas, or instead
represented merely a factor to be considered as part of a generalized inquiry under Penn Central into
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Lingle's discussion of Nollan and Dolan's scope will not be so easy
to ignore, however. Unlike in Del Monte Dunes, the Court in Lingle
thoroughly discussed the facts, legal rules, and rationale of its exactions
decisions, offering its most comprehensive consideration of the exactions
issues since Dolan. More significantly, the Court explained that, in order
to settle the legal issue in Lingle, which required an integrated approach
to the regulatory takings doctrine, it needed to explain its decisions in
Nollan and Dolan.'6 Insofar as Nollan and Dolan had appeared to
depend (but, the Court instructed, did not in fact depend) in part upon
the Agins test that the Court was discarding, and insofar as both parties
had argued in their briefs about the precise relationship between the
exactions decisions and Agins's "substantially advances" test,' 69 the Court
was required to explain how its decision would affect the viability of the
nexus and proportionality tests. 7 ' For the Court's integrated theory of
regulatory takings to cohere, it needed to provide a rationale for why
Nollan and Dolan fit within this theory. Part III accomplished that goal,
at least to the Court's satisfaction, and thus was central to the Court's
rationale.' 7 ' Lingle's discussion of the exactions decisions is therefore best
understood as a necessary step along the decisional path to its outcome
and part of its holding, rather than as dicta.'72
whether a taking occurred. See id. at 306 ("The question presented is whether a moratorium on
development imposed during the process of devising a comprehensive land-use plan constitutes a per
se taking of property requiring compensation under the Takings Clause of the United States
Constitution."); id. at 337 ("In rejecting petitioners' per se rule, we do not hold that the temporary
nature of a land-use restriction precludes finding that it effects a taking; we simply recognize that it
should not be given exclusive significance one way or the other."). Nevertheless, Justice Stevens's sixjustice majority decision stated unequivocally that the Court had adopted a "parcel as a whole rule" in
which plaintiffs could not divide their parcel into discrete segments in order to make a regulation seem
more destructive of their property rights. See id. at 331. This conclusion was not entirely inapposite to
the question before the Court, because the Tahoe-Sierra plaintiffs were attempting to sever their
temporal property rights in discrete segments in order to claim that a moratorium affected the entire
value of their property for the period of time in which it was in place. Id. at 318. But the extension of
the Court's narrow holding to the severance of space was neither conceptually necessary nor required
for the Court to reach its result-although, ironically, it did respond to earlier dicta from Justice
Scalia's decision in Lucas. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, ioi6 n.7 (1992)
(suggesting that the denominator, or baseline of analysis, of the property affected in a regulatory
takings claim, should be based upon "how the owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by
the State's law of property," although conceding that the issue was not before the Court). For a critical
view of Tahoe-Sierra'sdicta, see Steven J. Eagle, PlanningMoratoria,and Regulatory Takings: The
Supreme Court's FairnessMandate Benefits Landowners, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 429, 441-47 (2o04).
168. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547-48 (2005).
169. Brief for Petitioners at 29, 33-35, 45-46, 48, Lingle, 544 U.S. 528 (No. 04-163); Brief for
i
Respondent at 11-12, 18-19, 21-23, 33,36, 40-4 , Lingle, 544 U.S. 528 (No. 04-163).
17o. As one commentator described the matter, taking away Agins as a foundation left Nollan and
Dolan in a "precarious position." Sarah B. Nelson, Case Comment, Lingle v. Chevron USA, Inc., 30
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281, 290 (2oo6).

171. See Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article I1, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2040-41 (1994) (arguing
that a holding includes the rationale of a decision, as well as its facts and outcome).
172. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Steams, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, io68
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If Part III of Lingle is not dicta, then the Court has firmly
established that the factual predicates of its exactions decisions"adjudicative land-use exactions . . . specifically, government demands
that a landowner dedicate an easement allowing public access to her
property as a condition of obtaining a development permit""'7 3-are 74
material to the applicability of the nexus and proportionality tests.'
Even if Lingle's discussion of the exactions decisions is seen merely as
dicta, however, lower courts must view that discussion's restatement of
Nollan and Dolan as persuasive. In Lingle, the Court extensively
explained the scope of those decisions, one aspect of which it had already
declared six years earlier in Del Monte Dunes.7 s It may have been
unclear initially that the exactions challenged in Nollan and Dolan were
constitutionally suspect because of their substantive requirements and
the procedure by which they were imposed. But the Court's reiteration in
Lingle that those facts have great constitutionally significance has now
made these substantive and procedural qualities appear to be the
necessary threshold for heightened scrutiny.
IV. EXACTIONS, POST-2005: REGULATORY CONDITIONS IN A
CONSTITUTIONAL SHADOW

Lingle failed in two respects to settle the Court's
constitutionalization of exactions: it appeared to resolve live issues
without a live controversy that raised those issues, and it did so without
fully explaining its reasons. Part III addressed the former failure; this
Part attempts to compensate for the latter. It begins by explaining why
the limits the Court placed on Nollan and Dolan's applicability in Lingle

(2005) (characterizing a necessary step along the decisional path as a component of a decision's
holding, rather than dicta). My argument is not intended to assert that the line between holding and
dictum is obvious or discernible in the abstract. The problem of identifying that line is both formal and
behavioralist. The tension between a narrow, particularistic reading of the judicial text and efforts to
read decisions broadly in search of a generalizable, replicable rule that can be applied in future
decisions may ultimately be unresolvable, part of an ongoing jurisprudential dialectic-related and
analogous to the dialectic between rules and standards, for example, a quandary that also surfaces in
regulatory takings doctrine. See Charles W. Collier, Precedentand Legal Authority: A CriticalHistory,
1988 Wis. L. REv. 771, 824-25; cf. Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REv. 379, 383
(1985). And as the authors of the most recent, extremely exhaustive effort to define dicta themselves
admit, any effort to identify a clear holding/dicta line will face resistance from judges who strategically
employ the concept to avoid precedents they dislike or reach results they prefer. See Abramowicz &
Stearns, supra, at 1093. That said, even if the line cannot be drawn in the abstract and the concepts are
sufficiently indeterminate to allow bad-acting judges to willfully ignore precedent or reasonable
arguments to be made on either side in difficult cases, there is sufficient content to the distinction to
allow a line to be drawn in particular cases.
173. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 546-47 (emphasis added).
174. For summaries of the literature on the precedential value of material facts, see Larry
Alexander, Constrainedby Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. I, 18 n.21 (1989); Dorf, supra note 171, at
2036 nn. 142-43.
175. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
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make practical sense. The first three sections of this Part describe an
institutional web of local authority and restraint -including decisions
made by state and local institutions, as well as by private individualsthat operates alongside the Court's formalist rules. This network is more
diverse and responsive to local regulatory needs than the Court's
doctrine. The final section explains how the existence and operation of
this institutional web of constraints on local government discretion fits
within Lingle's broad restatement of the regulatory takings doctrine.
A.

STATE LEGISLATURES AND STATE COURTS

The Takings Clause, as enforced by federal and state courts, is not
the sole restraint on local regulatory authority. In the first instance, state
legislatures and courts can simply deny local governments the authority
to impose exactions at all. 76 The great increase in exactions was first
authorized during the 197os and 198os by state courts, which found
implied municipal authority to impose exactions.'77 Soon thereafter,
many legislatures, especially in fast-growing regions of the country,
granted municipalities explicit authority to impose impact fees, with the
result that their use expanded rapidly in the late r98os and early I99OS. 1"8
In a number of instances, the development and real estate industries in
individual states played significant roles in the drafting and passage of
those states' impact fee statutes. 79 Much of the legislation focused on
176. See generally MANDELKER, supra note II, at §§ 9.18, .21 (noting that fewer than half the
states have adopted legislation authorizing impact fees, and discussing state court decisions ruling on
local authority to impose exactions and impact fees in the absence of clear statutory authority). Iowa,
for example, has provided neither statutory nor common law authority to impose impact fees. See
Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Des Moines v. City of W. Des Moines, 644 N.W.2d 339,349-50 (Iowa
2002) (holding that municipalities are not authorized to levy impact fees); Madelaine Jerousek, Who
pays for growth: Developers or Cities?, DES MOINES REGISTER, July 8, 2002, at IA. By contrast, the
California Supreme Court long ago found them authorized under state law. See Ayres v. City Council
of Los Angeles, 207 P.2d 1, 42-43 (Cal. 1949).
177. See, e.g., Contractors & Builder's Ass'n of Pinellas County vs. City of Dunedin, 370 So.2d 458
(Fla. 1976) (striking down a system development fee, but providing guidelines for an acceptable
impact fee system); N.J. Builders Ass'n v. Mayor of Bernards Township, 528 A.2d 555, 557-60 (N.J.
1987) (summarizing the development of exactions as a regulatory tool and state court responses to the
issue of local authority to impose them); Frona M. Powell, Challenging Authority for Municipal
Subdivision Exactions: The Ultra Vires Attack, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 635, 645-70 (I99o) (summarizing
state court decisions on inherent local authority to impose exactions). Histories of how particular
states authorized exactions demonstrate the mix of constitutional, statutory, and common law
authorities through which state courts resolved challenges to municipal power to impose exactions. See
Norman Marcus, Development Exactions: The Emerging Law in New York State, in PRIVATE SUPPLY OF
PUBLIC SERVICES, supra note 53, at 66.
178. See Been, supra note 34, at 141; Martin L. Leitner & Susan P. Schoettle, A Survey of State
Impact Fee Enabling Legislation, 25 URB. LAW. 491, 491-92 & n.6 (s993); Miller, supra note 52, at 57.
For an informative history of the evolution of exactions requiring conservation easements from an ad
hoc, individualized process to one governed by state statutes, see Jessica Owley Lippmann, The
Emergence of Exacted Conservation Easements, 84 NEB. L. REV. 1043, 1096-1102 (2006).
179. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 52, at 57; James van Hemert, Nevada Development Impact Fees, in
DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES IN THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN REGION, supra note 52, at 51.
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impact fees and fees in lieu of dedication, due to their administrative
advantages over dedications of land. Parcels of land and parts thereof
that might be required for an exaction of land are unique (and treated as
such under the common law), while impact fees appear more precisely
quantitative and scientific, and the money they raise can be used more
flexibly than can an immobile piece of land.'
State legislation has thereby become the most significant mechanism
for controlling local discretion to impose exactions. The resulting statutes
vary widely, reflecting a sensitivity to statewide needs, local regulatory
practice, the relationship between a particular state and its municipal
authorities, and state and local politics.' 8 ' They significantly overlap in
their generalities but diverge in their particulars. For example, they
typically limit local authority to impose impact fees, or limit exactions to
particular types of exactions, but they vary as to which types of exactions
they will allow.182 Some states authorize their local governments by
statute to require land dedications for certain purposes,"" while
Massachusetts specifically forbids municipalities from requiring the

i8o. See Fenster, supra note lo, at 645-48. Empirical studies of exactions practices have not
identified precisely how fees are typically set and what percentage are set legislatively rather than

individually, but research seems to indicate that at least with respect to impact fees, the majority are
constituted legislatively, frequently through formulas based on the anticipated marginal costs of each
new unit. See Been, supra note 34, at 144.
181. Arizona, for example, grants a general authority for assessing development fees to cities, but
specifically enumerates a limited number of facilities for which fees can be assessed. Compare ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9-463.05(A) (1996 & Supp. 2006) (cities), with id. § IX-l102(A) (counties). But see
Home Builders Ass'n of C. Ariz. v. City of Apache Junction, II P. 3 d 1032, 1040 (Ariz. App. Div. 2000)
(suggesting that different legislative provisions do not grant cities open-ended authority to use impact
fees to fund school construction costs).
182. California's exactions statutes are exceptionally broad. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66ooi-66023
(West 1997 & Supp. 2007) (Mitigation Fee Act, authorizing local agencies to require payment of fees
to defray allor a portion of the cost of public facilities related to a development project); id. §§ 6641166484.5 (Subdivision Map Act, authorizing local agencies to require improvements on land as
condition of subdivision map approval); id. § 66475 (authorizing local agency to require "dedication or
irrevocable offer of dedication of real property within the subdivision for streets, alleys, including
access rights and abutter's rights, drainage, public utility easements and other public easements"). New
Hampshire's statute is less broad than California's set of statutory authorities, but is nevertheless
extensive. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6 7 4 :21(V) (1996 & Supp. 2006) (enumerating an exclusive but
extensive list of facilities for which impact fees can be collected). Texas has a quite complicated and
elaborate statute. TEX. Loc. Gov'T CODE § 395.001(4) (Vernon 2005) (defining "impact fees" to
include "a charge or assessment imposed by a political subdivision against new development in order
to generate revenue for funding or recouping the costs of capital improvements or facility expansions
necessitated by and attributable to the new development" and dedications of land, as well as certain
types of fees for constructing and extending water mains or lines). Illinois, by contrast, only authorizes
exactions for road improvements, see 6o5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-901 (West 1993), and for school
grounds, see 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-12-5(7) (West 2005); Thompson v. Vill. of Newark, 768
N.E.2d 856, 859 (I1. App. 2002) (construing use of the phrase "school grounds" in impact fee statute
narrowly to exclude impact fees for school buildings).
183. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 4 62.358(2b) (2001 & Supp. 2007); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 277(4)
(McKinney 2004).
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dedication of land for a public way, park, or playground as a condition
for subdivision approval without the payment of compensation."4 Some
states even delegate authority to special districts to impose impact fees
on new development for the district's particular purpose."s
State statutes typically impose procedural requirements on local
promulgation of exactions ordinances, although they vary in how they do
so. A number of states, especially in the intermountain west, require the
participation of private citizens in the process by which impact fee
ordinances are passed, and some include explicit requirements that
developers have a significant voice in that process. Some statutes
impose upon local governments the duty to plan comprehensively for the
financing of their capital infrastructural improvements,'8 7 and thus
passage of the comprehensive plan and its ongoing revision and
amendment over time can check future local discretion.' Colorado has a
general, explicit requirement that all exactions must be imposed pursuant
to a duly adopted law, regulation, or policy, or to some adequate
standard applied on a rational and consistent basis."" And most impact
fee statutes stipulate elements or methodologies that a local government
must include in its fee schedules,'" as well as specify the means for
collecting funds and accounting for their use.'9'
State legislatures typically include provisions establishing
184. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 41, § 81Q (West 2006). This predisposition in Massachusetts
against exactions extends to the judicial review of impact fees as well. See Lawrence Friedman & Eric
W. Wodlinger, MunicipalImpact Fees in Massachusetts,88 MAss. L. REV. 131, 134 (2004).
185. In the Boise area, for example, the Ada County Highway District, under Idaho state
authority, began in 1992 to collect impact fees for public roads. See CONNIE B. COOPER,
TRANSPORTATION IMPACT FEES AND EXCISE TAXES 21 -23 (2000).

186. See ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBAREZ, supra note 30, at 53-54; see, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67(Mitchie 2oo6) (requiring that every governmental entity that adopts an impact fee program

8205(2)

appoint an advisory committee of at least five members, two of whom must be active in the land
development, construction, or real estate industry); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 278B.I50(2)(a)-(b)
(LexisNexis 2002) (requiring every government body imposing an impact fee to have a "capital
improvements advisory committee" of at least five members, at least one of whom must represent the
real estate, development, or building industry).
187. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-8-2(P) (LexisNexis 2004); TEX. Loc. GOV'T CODE § 395.014; WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 82.02-050 (West 2006).
i88. Daniel R. Mandelker, Planningand the Law, 20 VT. L. REV. 657, 658-6o (1996).
189. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-20-204(2)(e) (West 2006).
19o. See, e.g., id. § 29-20-104.5(2) (requiring local government to "quantify the reasonable impacts"
of the development on capital facilities, and prohibiting fees that would remedy existing deficiencies);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 6-i-980 (2004) (stipulating means to calculate maximum allowable amount of
impact fee, and requiring the use of "generally accepted accounting principles" in calculation).
191. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66oo6 (West 1997 & Supp. 2007) (requiring earmarking of impact
fee receipts and placement of funds in separate interest-bearing accounts); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 29-i-8OI to 29-1-804 (similar earmarking requirement to those of California); W. VA. CODE ANN, § 72o-8(d) (West 2006) (same); Douglas County Contractors Ass'n v. Douglas County, 929 P.2d 253, 25657 (Nev. 1996) (striking down county's school impact fee ordinance for failing to follow state
legislation that required earmarking of collected funds).
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substantive standards in their statutes, in order to make certain that
impact fees are fairly applied and that they promote, or at least do not
hinder, other important public policy goals. At minimum, impact fee
statutes impose a "reasonable relationship" test on fees that are
imposed.92 Colorado and Utah have codified the nexus and
proportionality tests from Nollan and Dolan for individualized and
discretionary exactions, and have extended those tests to fees as well as
to required dedications of land.93 In contrast, Washington state's
supreme court has held that its state's impact fee statute specifically does
not incorporate the Nollan and Dolan tests (which, the Court reasoned in
dicta, do not apply to fees and may not apply to legislatively imposed
exactions) and requires only that impact fees be "reasonably related and
beneficial to the particular development seeking approval," while it
authorizes fees that would fund area-wide infrastructure.'" A number of
statutes also protect against excessive exactions by explicitly prohibiting
their use either to remedy current inadequacies in capital infrastructure
or to upgrade the jurisdiction's current level of service provision and
infrastructure. 95 And at least one statute requires local governments to
reduce or waive a legislative impact fee for affordable housing and 96for
economic development if it is expected to increase sales tax revenues.'
At the same time, state courts do more than simply enforce Nollan
and Dolan. The issue of local authority to impose development
conditions, which was more significant during the first (pre-Nollan)
generation of exactions, I" remains important for those states whose
legislatures have not granted express exactions authority to local
governments.' And, for local governments authorized to impose
exactions, state courts enforce the requirements and limits imposed by
state legislatures on this power.'"
192. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66oo(3)-(4) (requiring local agency seeking to impose an impact
fee to find "a reasonable relationship" between the fee's use and the type of development project on
which the fee is imposed" and between the need for the public facility and the type of development
project on which the fee is imposed).
I93. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-20-203(t); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27a-507 (2005); B.A.M.
Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake County, 128 P.3 d 116I, 1i68 (Utah 2oo6). Colorado's legislative scheme
extending Nollan and Dolan to fees as well as land, but limiting their applicability to individualized
exactions, codified the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist.,

19 P3 d 687, 697 (Colo. 2ooi).

194. City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3 d 802, 81 1 (Wash.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 436 (2006).
195. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 36-71-8 (West 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 278B.280 (LexisNexis
2002).

196. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-8-3(D), 5-8-13 (LexisNexis 2004).
197. See supra Part I.A.
198. See 4 ANDERSON'S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 25 :24 (4th ed. 1996)
199. See, e.g., Cherokee County v. Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Ass'n, 566 S.E.2d 470, 475-76
(Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (upholding an impact fee against challenge under a state statute limiting exactions
to a "proportionate share" of the cost of infrastructural system improvements); Simonsen v. Town of
Derby, 765 A.2d 1033, 1036 (N.H. 2000) (invalidating an impact fee imposed by a municipal planning
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As with legislatures that have established similar but nevertheless
distinct exactions statutes, state courts have taken disparate approaches
to creating standards for reviewing exactions under state constitutional
law."° Some courts, such as Utah's Supreme Court, have formulated
complex multi-factor tests to review the extent of the burden created by
an exaction."' Florida's Supreme Court, by contrast, has come up with a

far simpler "dual rational nexus test" that has proven more influential for
courts and commentators." ' The Illinois Supreme Court continues to
apply its "specifically and uniquely attributable" test for exactions,
which was recognized by the Court in Dolan as one of the strictest of the
pre-Nollan state court standards."°
To illustrate the relationship between state and local government
and among the several state governments, consider a recent intermediate
appellate decision from Massachusetts, Greater Franklin Developers
Ass'n, Inc. v. Town of Franklin." Franklin is a fast-growing town outside6
of Boston that, in the mid-i99os, suffered from a shortage of schools.21
On the advice of consultants, the town adopted an impact fee ordinance
that would "'ensure[] that development bears a proportionate share of
the cost of capital facilities necessary to accommodate such development
and to promote and protect the public health, safety and welfare."' 2 The
town's ordinance included a schedule of fees placed on different types of
housing and based upon the anticipated number of children in each type,

board because the town had failed to pass an impact fee ordinance required by state statute).
200. See generally Nick Rosenberg, Comment, Development Impact Fees: Is Limited Cost
Internalization Actually Smart Growth?, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 641, 651-72 (2003) (surveying
different state court approaches).
201. See, e.g., Banberry Dev. Corp. v. S. Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 9o3 (Utah I98I) (listing seven
factors that concern the burden that new development will create on existing infrastructure and the
existing manner the way in which the municipality uses to finance existing capital facilities).
California's Supreme Court requires the consideration of thirteen factors. See Kavanau v. Santa
Monica Rent Control Bd., 941 P.2d 851, 86o-6i (Cal. 1997) (listing and explaining factors); Massingill
v. Dep't of Food & Agric., 125 Cal. Rptr. 2d 561, 566-67 (Ct. App. 2002) (applying factors).
2o2. See Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward County, 431 So. 2d 6o6, 6o9-io (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983)
(developing a due process-based "dual rational nexus test" that considers whether there is a
reasonable connection between, first, the locality's need for additional capital facilities and the new
development; and, second, the funds collected and the benefits accruing to the new development);
accord Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349, 356 (Ohio 2000) (adopting dual
rational nexus test); Julian C. Juergensmeyer & James C. Nicholas, Impact Fees Should Not Be
Subjected to Takings Analysis, in TAKING SIDES ON TAKINGS ISSUES 357, 359-63 (Thomas E. Roberts
ed., 2002) (arguing in favor of dual rational nexus test and its conceptual and practical superiority to
Nollan and Dolan).
2o3. See N. Ill. Home Builders v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 389-90 (Ill.
1995) (applying
test from Pioneer Trust & Sav. Bank v. Mt. Prospect, 176 N.E.2d 799 (Ill.
1961), to review impact fee
enabling statute).
2o4. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,389-9 (1994) (discussing Pioneer Trust test).
205. 73o N.E.2d goo (Mass. App. Ct. 2000).
206. Id. at 9oo-oi.
207. Id. at got (quoting FRANKLIN, MASS., TOWN CODE § 83-2(2)).
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and required that the fees be placed in a separate fund with unused
portions returned to the developer after eight years."' Applying a
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decision from 1983 that applied a
very narrow definition of a user "fee" that a Massachusetts municipality
could legally charge, the court in Greater Franklin Developers declared
the ordinance invalid as an impermissible tax because the benefits of the
impact fees would redound to the entire community and not just to the
projected new residents.2" As a general matter, the court reasoned,
everyone profits from an educated population."' Furthermore, the
facilities built from the proceeds of the impact fees intended for the use
of future residents would at least be accessible to, and might even be
enjoyed by, current residents who had contributed nothing to the
facilities' expense."
Relying on precedent and older decisions from other jurisdictions,
the court staked out Massachusetts law as a harsh outlier, one that
rejected less stringent standards like Florida's dual rational nexus test.12
Lacking support in existing state common law and refused review by the
Supreme Judicial Court,1 3 the town was left to petition the state
legislature for the authority to pass an ordinance imposing impact fees.
To date, the Massachusetts legislature has not obliged." 4 Whether correct
or foolish as a matter of policy, the state has refused to grant its
municipalities broad authority to use exactions, thereby illustrating that
states can and do serve as avid protectors of the interests of property
owners and developers, even in the face of a general judicial and
legislative shift toward expanding a general, if still limited, authority to
impose exactions.
B.

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, LOCAL ORDINANCES

Local governments check their own discretion as well, by
committing to substantive and procedural standards through local
ordinances. These commitments are especially important because, even
208. Id.

Id. at 902 (quoting Emerson College v. City of Boston, 462 N.E.2d io98, stoS (Mass. 1984)).
210. Id.
211. See id. Thus, the school impact fee differed from the electrical service connection fee upheld
209.

in Bertone v. Departmentof Public Utilities, 583 N.E.2d 829, 836 (Mass. 1992), which was exclusively
for the benefit of the new development.
212. See Greater Franklin Developers Ass'n, 730 N.E.2d at 903 (citing Daniels v. Borough of Point
Pleasant, 129 A.2d 265 (N.J. 1957) for support, and distinguishing St. Johns County v. Northeast
Florida Builders Assn., Inc., 583 So.2d 635 (Fla. i99i)).
213. See Greater Franklin Developers Ass'n, 738 N.E.2d at 750; see also Friedman & Wodlinger,
supra note 184, at 137 (arguing that Massachusetts courts should adopt Florida's dual rational nexus
test).
214. See Patric O'Brien, Comment, The Bizarre Journey of Impact Fees in Massachusetts:From the
"Foothillsof Confusion" Around the "Mountainsof Ignorance" and Up Into the "Castle in the Air"Will "Rhyme" and "Reason" Ever Be Rescued?, 35 NEw ENG. L. REv. 51 1,541-43 (2oo1).
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before Lingle, exactions that were imposed by legislation or that imposed
monetary exactions could avoid the constitutional nexus and
proportionality rules, depending on how the relevant state courts had
interpreted Nollan and Dolan."5 Whether passed because of a state
legislative mandate or because of a decision to commit legislatively to
particular regulatory practices, these ordinances represent an important
self-imposed check on local regulatory discretion.
Due in part to differences among state exactions statutes, as well as
to their unique regulatory needs, politics, and commitment to regulation,
such ordinances vary widely." 6 Consider the exactions ordinances of
several fast-growing mid-sized cities, that ranked at the top of recent
reports tracking patterns of domestic migration. 17 These ordinances, and
the regulatory practices they limit and direct, show similar patterns and
important divergences. Fayetteville, Arkansas and Austin, Texas, for
example, have promulgated a somewhat similar, limited set of
enumerated exactions ordinances despite significant distinctions between
their state impact fee statutes.2x' Arizona's impact fee statute provides
215. See supra text accompanying notes 96-1o3.

216. On the reasons why local jurisdictions are likely to vary in their desire and ability to impose
exactions, see Been, supra note 34, at 151-52.
217. The small sample that follows is based on cities that appeared at the top of the 2004 and 2005
U-Haul National Migration Trend Report, which tracks growth areas for families that transacted with
U-Haul during a calendar year. See Press Release, U-Haul, Int'l, Inc., U-Haul Ranks Austin, Texas
and
Boise,
Idaho
Top
2005
Growth
Cities
(Apr.
14,
2006),
available at
www.uhaul.com/pr/publication.ashx?id=9633 [hereinafter 2oo5 Report]; Press Release, U-Haul, Int'l,
Inc., U-Haul Ranks Fayetteville, Arkansas and Boise, Idaho Top 2004 Growth Cities (Feb., 21, 20o5),
available at www.uhaul.com/pr/publication.ashx?id=6o7i [hereinafter 2oo4 Report]. This does not
purport either to represent a scientific sample of cities, nor-because it includes neither counties nor
special districts-of the range of municipal exactions ordinance. Instead, this is merely intended to
serve as a snapshot of several fast-growing cities located in different states and regions in order to
demonstrate the variance among cities that adopt exactions ordinances.
In U-Haul's 2004 survey of cities with more than ten thousand families moving, Fayetteville,
Arkansas finished first, Austin, Texas finished third, and Mesa, Arizona finished fourth. 2004 Report,
supra. In the 2005 survey, Austin finished first and Aurora, Illinois finished second. 2005 Report,
supra. In U-Haul's 2004 and 2005 survey of cities with between 5000 and Io,ooo families moving in,
Boise, Idaho finished first both years and Victorville, California finished second in 2005 and fourth in
2004. 2005 Report, supra; 2004 Report, supra. Des Moines, Iowa, which finished third in the five-to-ten
thousand category in 2005 and second in 2004, 2005 Report, supra; 2004 Report, supra, is prohibited

by the state constitution from imposing impact fees, and to date has not received authorization from
the state legislature to pose them. See supra note 176.
218. Fayetteville's city code imposes impact fees for water and wastewater impacts, police and
public safety system impacts, and fire safety system impacts, many of which were adopted only
recently after the state legislature granted municipalities explicit authority to impose impact fees.
FAYETrEVILLE, ARK., CITY OF FAYETrEVILLE UNIFIED DEVELOPMENT CODE §§ 159.02, .03, .04 (2OO5). The

state passed an impact fee statute in 2003, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-56-103 (2005), although its state
supreme court has found police power authority for fees that are fair and reasonable and that bear a
reasonable relationship to the benefit to recipients of the improved service. See City of Marion v.
Baioni, 850 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ark. 1993). More than two decades ago, the Arkansas Supreme Court struck
down an early impact fee that Fayetteville had imposed for parks and park facilities on the grounds
that the city had not planned sufficiently to justify the developer's contribution and had failed to
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more authority to local governments to set impact fees, 19 and the city of
Mesa's impact fee ordinance collects a far broader range of fees, ranging
from water and wastewater to public safety and fire safety, and including
parks, cultural facilities, and libraries." And despite Illinois' heightened
judicial scrutiny of exactions,22' the city of Aurora includes a significant
range of exactions in its code, including the dedication of land for schools
and parks, and a variety of fees."' A number of these cities offer
exemptions from impact fees for certain types of development, including
affordable housing."3
Local governments frequently adopt substantive standards in their
ordinances that reflect an understanding of the Supreme Court's
quantitative and qualitative exactions tests. The proportionality issue is
clearest in impact fee ordinances, which typically operate formulaically
through a schedule of fees or some generally applicable calculation
whose methodology is specified in the ordinance itself.2 They thereby
attempt to meet state legislative requirements and frequently adopt the
constitutional requirements for the proportionality test under Dolan (or
a relatively equivalent standard), while offering a gloss of mathematical
precision and fairness. Because of the development in disciplines such as
traffic engineering, some types of anticipated impacts lend themselves
more clearly to formulas and as such are more widely adopted as subject
matter for impact fees. 25 Localities also legislate qualitative standards

provide for a refund in the event that the parks were not developed. See City of Fayetteville v. IBI,
Inc., 659 S.W.2d 505, 5o7-o8 (Ark. 1983).

Austin's city code imposes water and wastewater impact fees on subdivisions, AUSTIN, TEX.,
AUSTIN CITY CODE § 25-9-324 (20o6), and parkland dedication requirements, id. § 30-2-214. The Texas
impact fee statute is significantly older than Arkansas's and much more complicated. TEX. LOCAL
GOV'T CODE §§ 395.OOl-.O8O (2oo6); see also MANDELKER, supra note I If, § 9.21 (characterizing Texas
statute as "[o]ne of the most elaborate impact fee statutes").
219. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 9.563.05 (1996 & Supp. 2oo6); see also Douglas A. Jorden & Randal W.
Studer, Arizona Development Impact Fees, in DEVELOPMENT IMPACr FEES IN THE RocKY MOUNTAIN
REGION, supra note 52, at 1-4 (describing history of Arizona statute authorizing cities to levy impact
fees and characterizing the use of fees in the state as "common").
220. MESA, ARIZ., MESA CITY CODE § 5-17-5(A) (2oo6).

221. See supratext accompanying note 204.
222. AURORA, ILL., AURORA CITY CODE § 43-56 (2oo6) (requiring dedication of land or payment of
a fee in lieu of dedication for schools "to serve the immediate and future needs of the residents of the
development as a condition of subdivision approval"); id. § 23-1 () (requiring parkland dedication);
id. §§ 23-16, -17, -18 (impact fees for public works, the fire department, and school development).
223. AUSTIN CITY CODE § 25-9-347; BOISE CITY CODE § 4-12-08(B); Crrv oF FAYETrEVILLE UNIFIED
DEVELOPMENT CODE § I59.o2(D)(4), t59.03(D)(4), I59.04(D)(4).

224. See, e.g., MESA CITY CODE § 5-17, Tables I-7 (detailing a schedule of impact fees); BOISE CITY
CODE § 4 -12-13(F), (G), (H) (providing methodology for park impact fee schedule, and allowing for
individual assessment where the fee payer can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the
established impact fee is inappropriate).
225. See COOPER, supranote 185, at 9-15 (summarizing study of sixteen jurisdictions' transportation

impact fees and taxes, and identifying the formulaic basis of the methodologies most use, which
includes a manual produced by the Institute of Transportation Engineers). Traffic is also typically a
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that parallel Nollan's nexus test (without always adopting its rigor),
frequently by incorporating a relevant state standard that requires a
relationship between the exaction and the impact that the development is
expected to cause.

226

Although similar to each other, these ordinances demonstrate no
clear substantive pattern. Local government ordinances do not
necessarily exercise the full extent of potential municipal authority under
state law. Rather than using their authority to maximize leverage,
municipal legislative practices reflect the exigent and contingent political
realities that the local legislature faced when the ordinances were passed.
And, although they bind themselves by ordinance, their actual practices
may vary widely-perhaps by requiring additional exactions beyond
those stated in local legislation, and perhaps, too, by exacting money or
land at other points in the development process. 27
JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION, PRIVATE DECISIONS

C.

As numerous commentators have argued, the competitive market
between jurisdictions for attracting residents, businesses, and industry
disciplines local governments that otherwise might exploit property
owners through excessive exactions."' Across the country, within a
region, and even in a metropolitan area, local governments compete with
each other for residents by offering a package of taxes, services, and
amenities; individuals, businesses, and industry respond as market
participants by moving into and away from jurisdictions based on their
preferences. 2 9 Although real property is a fixed resource and cannot be
moved between jurisdictions (except insofar as the jurisdictional borders
are unstable), new entrants arrive and purchase property and existing
residents depart and sell property based in part on their response to
actions taken and signals sent by local governments. Such actions and
signals include the regulation of land use. Local governments with high
proportions of valuable residential housing tend to perform a "race to
the top" of environmental control and planning. They do so because such
regulation is politically popular among homeowners seeking to protect
the values in their property by limiting the risk of local and
matter of great public concern. Id. at i I.
226. See, e.g., AURORA CrrY CODE § 23-I8(a) (school development fees must cover only a
"proportionate share" of costs); BOISE CITY CODE §§ 4-12-05, -o6 (2o0O6) (requiring that exactions
impose a "proportionate share" of costs); VICTORVILLE, CAL., VICTORVILLE MUNICIPAL CODE
§ 15.04.O60(b) (2oo6) (requiring that the city council demonstrate a "reasonable relationship" between
impact fees and new development).

227. See supra note I 1 I.
228. FISCHEL, supra note 36, at 39-97; Been, supra note 29, at 475; Fennell, supranote 14, at 53-54,

56-58.
229. See FISCHEL, supra note 36, at 58-63; Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. EcON. 416,419-20 (1956).
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neighborhood change.23
Accordingly, municipal decisions to exact property and money in the
development of land, with their attendant effects on the value of existing
and proposed new development, take place within a market-like
system."' Regulatory decisions about whether and to what extent a
jurisdiction imposes exactions on new development will affect property
values throughout the community, levels of participation in local politics
and the results of local elections, and, ultimately, entry into and exit from
the community. "32 The threat of homeowner disaffection is at once
public-insofar as it can result in political changes to the composition of
the elected bodies that preside over land use regulation-and privateinsofar as individual decisions to exit affect the composition of
communities and the values of property within them. 3'
The discipline that competing jurisdictions provide is not perfect.
Local governments can exploit their monopoly of police power authority
within their jurisdiction, while individual homeowners have immobile
assets. Moreover, one group that could be harmed by excessive
exactions, potential homebuyers, are frequently not citizens of the
community that imposes the exactions that affect them. 34
Interjurisdictional competition can also create significant distributive
problems, insofar as the consumers of local public goods have vastly
different financial resources and mobility, and people's preferences for
living near and pooling resources with those of similar demographics and
resources can impact the quality of a jurisdiction's public goods. 35 And
the Tiebout model itself fails to capture both the complex and dynamic
internal operations of local governments and the extent of their
authority- issues that affect both the exactions that a municipality can
impose and the bureaucratic practices and politics that it actually does
impose."' Nonetheless, the dynamics produced by market-like public and
private behavior provide a further brake on local discretion to impose
exactions.

230. FiSCHEL, supra note 36, at 3-to.

231. See Rose, supranote 35, at 886.
232. See id. at 882-87 (adapting ALBERT 0.

HIRSCHMAN, Exrr, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (I970) to the
political economy of local land use regulation).
233. Indeed, the relationships between political voice and exit, and between the putatively private
concerns of community composition/property values and the putatively public concerns of electoral
politics, demonstrate the meaninglessness of the public/private distinction itself.
234. See Sterk, supra note 47, at 832.
235. Lee Anne Fennell, Homes Rule, 112 YALE L.J. 617, 663 (2002) (reviewing FISCHEL, supra note

36).
236. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part l-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346,
400-01 (1990).
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LINGLE, EXACTIONS, AND THE COURT'S INSTITUTIONALIST

Focus

This complex mix of institutional oversight, which includes but is not
defined by the constraints imposed by the Takings Clause, explains why
Lingle commands a narrow application of Nollan and Dolan. Lingle
recognized the problems caused when the judiciary relies upon the
limited authority provided by the Takings Clause to engage in
heightened scrutiny of substantive, discretionary regulatory decisions.
Lingle's institutionalist focus sets forth a mixture of hard rules and
deferential standards that invite searching judicial review in factual
circumstances when competent institutions appear to have overstepped
their constitutional authority by confiscating property. When those facts
are not in evidence, the Constitution requires a far less rigorous
balancing of indeterminate factors. In those latter instances, local
administrative agencies are sufficiently competent, and sufficiently
overseen by external political institutions, to deserve deference. Lingle
extended this approach to its exactions decisions by narrowing the
application of the Takings Clause only to exactions that strongly suggest
the government has overstepped its authority. In the absence of facts
creating that inference, other institutions can more competently provide
the less strenuous oversight required to check local discretion.
In Lingle, the Court failed to specify why these other institutions are
especially competent and worthy of deference in the specific context of
exactions. But in Lingle and in the other takings decisions from the 2004
Term, the Court explained why local institutions applying state and local
law are more competent than courts applying the Takings Clause.237 In
those decisions, all of which concerned property owner challenges to
local regulatory programs, the Court invoked the need for courts to defer
to a "carefully formulated" effort to plan comprehensively."" Likewise, it
warned against substituting a judicial judgment for one reached through
institutions, 39 and it preached respect and
politically accountable 40
"comity" to state courts It suggested that property owners frustrated
by the actions of their local governments could seek political solutions
through their state governments. And the Court sought explicitly to
match the proper formal test to the degree of deference that lower courts
should give the decisions of political and administrative agencies: Strong
takings rules are intended to focus heightened scrutiny on a narrowly
defined set of actions likely to lead to government rent-seeking and
exploitation, while deferential standards allow no more than a relatively
cursory review of actions where the agencies are likely to have more
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

The discussion that follows summarizes Fenster, supra note 25.
E.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,483 (2oo5).
See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528,541-44 (2oo5).
San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323,345 (20o5).
See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 489.
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expertise than courts."
In light of these general arguments, the justification for the Court's
implicit assumption about the desirability of other forms of institutional
oversight in the exactions context would be as follows. As this Article has
explained, local governments have been imposing exactions since before
the Court intervened in Nollan and have continued to do so, both under
Nollan and Dolan's commands and in their shadow, for more than a
decade now. They have been doing so with oversight from a web of local
and state institutions which provides property rights protections that are
less uniform but more sensitive to local circumstance and political
culture. These diverse elements enable greater interplay among levels of
government and public and private actors, more creativity and expertise
in devising and responding to regulatory strategies, and more checks and
balances between state actors and the forces that constrain state action.
The resulting regulatory practices have varied in effects and
effectiveness, but they nevertheless engender creativity in developing
and checking the use of exactions where locally appropriate regulatory
oversight is most available and valuable: in state and local legislatures
and in state courts applying state law.
The institutional web allows both a strong measure of local
discretion on the regulatory ground, and a complex set of institutional
constraints that operate ex ante and ex post. It thus affirms, in the first
instance, the localist emphasis in land use control. 3 As political theorists
from a broad array of traditions and normative perspectives have argued,
local government located within a decentralized system of governance
offers numerous advantages and boasts numerous virtues. A liberal,
Tocquevillean localism views decentralization as an instrumental means
to educate and develop self-governance;'
a Brandeisian localism
(derived from his characterization of states in a federalist system) views
decentralization as a source of innovation and experimentation;2 "5 a
Tieboutian localism views decentralization as a means to maximize
effective market competition in jurisdictions and to enable individual
choice;4 6 and a civic republican, communitarian, or radical vision of
decentralized localism views a small-sized, accessible, and responsive
See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537-39, 545-47.
243. See Marc R. Poirier, Federalism and Localism in Kelo and San Remo (July 23, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
244. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 6I (Henry Reeve trans., 1987); Roderick
242.

M. Hills, Jr., Is Federalism Good for Localism? The Localist Case for Federal Regimes, 21 J.L. & POL.
187, 188-91 (2005).
245. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country.").
246. See supratext accompanying notes 228-33.
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state as the government form most likely to enable a participatory
democracy and lively public sphere. 47 Limiting federal constitutional
constraints when other institutions demonstrably can provide more
effective oversight thus encourages a dynamic, more effective type of
local governance.
But excessive decentralization and local governmental autonomy
can prove dangerous, not only to the autonomy and well-being of a
municipality's own citizens but also to the autonomy and well-being of
other jurisdictions and their citizens (through, for example, spillover
costs). Accordingly, higher levels of authority are essential to preserve
not only individual and regional well-being, but also local autonomy
itself.' 8 That higher level of authority need not be the federal
constitution-it can be state governments that exercise control through
traditional areas of state constitutional, statutory, and common law. State
laws, defining and limiting both private property rights and municipal
government powers, offer a powerful, longstanding bulwark against
government oppression. At the same time, state laws and institutions in a
federalist system offer many of the same normative and instrumental
advantages over federal authorities as local governments offer over
federal and state authorities.249 The overlapping layers of oversight in
imposing exactions, from state statutes and common law to self-limiting
local ordinances and the market-like activity of private individuals,
demonstrate the advantage of a complex system of federalist governance
in which institutions can expand or recede in importance as regulatory
needs and oversight competencies develop."
Viewed this way, institutions and authorities that have classically
been viewed as oppositional dualities-such as legislative/judicial,
constitutional/statutory, federal/state, state/local, and public/private-can
operate in conjunction rather than in opposition. This is precisely the
advantage of allowing the Court's constitutional rules over exactions to
recede when it is unnecessary to check local discretion. The world of land
use regulation has become significantly more complicated and

247. See David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley's City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism,147 U.
PA. L. REV. 487, 494 (1999); Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. iO59, 106773 (i98o); Mark C. Gordon, Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New Approach to
Federalismin Congress and the Court, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 187, 218 (1996).
248. See Barron, supranote 40, at 385-89.
249. On the advantages of a federalist approach to the regulatory takings doctrine, see Melvyn R.
Durchslag, Forgotten Federalism: The Takings Clause and Local Land Use Decisions, 59 MD. L. REV.
464, 490-93 (2ooo); Frank I. Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence:A Comment on
Lucas and Judicial Conservatism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 327 (I993); Stewart E. Sterk, The
FederalistDimension of Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence,114 YALE L.J. 203, 270-71 (2OO4).
250. See, e.g., Alexandra B. Klass, Common Law and Federalismin the Age of the Regulatory State,
92 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (advocating development of state common law regulation in the
shadow of federal statutes).
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sophisticated over the past three decades, as states have involved
themselves more in local planning, state and local governments have
become more active in environmental protection, and all levels of
government, along with private entities, have become more accustomed
to operating together in land use regulation and development."' This
movement has recently led the land use scholar David Callies-who coauthored a 1971 book describing the "quiet revolution" in land use
regulation that advocated stronger checks on local discretion 5 ' - to
narrate a positive trajectory in which federal constitutional, state, and
local laws and agencies combine to provide more effective and
reasonably fair land use and environmental controls. 3 Callies suggested
that the Supreme Court's invigoration of the regulatory takings doctrine
helped to bring this complex system into being. 4 In the context of
exactions, Nollan and Dolan may well have served a significant role in
spurring development of more, and more sophisticated, institutional
implementation and oversight of exactions. But those decisions were
themselves imperfect and have had adverse consequences. Under the
Court's general approach to regulatory takings, as announced and
described in Lingle, the protections of Nollan and Dolan need apply only
in a limited fashion; an institutional web, operating in those decisions'
constitutional shadow, can ultimately provide better, more responsive
oversight.
One final note on the Court's debatable but confident line-drawing:
The factual distinctions upon which Lingle relies to demarcate the limits
of Nollan and Dolan's applicability are neither stable nor entirely
coherent. The line between legislative and adjudicative regulation
frequently dissolves at the local level where elected officials, who have
less expertise than the typical federal and state administrative agency,
make both legislative regulatory commands and administrative
regulatory decisions, and where the legislative process is more subject to
the political process failures of majoritarianism and factionalism. 55 And
the line between real and personal property similarly appears arbitrary
and does not emanate from the bare constitutional text, as the
confiscation of a thing rather than of land appears to its owner to be no

251.

See ROBERT H.

FREILICH, FROM SPRAWL TO SMART GROWTH: SUCCESSFUL LEGAL, PLANNING, AND

M. Haar, The Twilight of Land-Use Controls: A
ParadigmShift?, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 1Oli, 1030-32; John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The
Advent of Local Environmental Law, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 365,386-410 (2oo2).
252. See FRED BOSSELMAN & DAVID L. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL
(1971).
253. See David L. Callies, The Quiet Revolution Redux: How Selected Local Governments Have
Fared, 20 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 277 (2002).
254. Id. at 278.
255. See sources cited supra note ioI.
ENVIRONMENTAL

SYSTEMS 209-52 (1999); Charles
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less a "taking" of "property.,,6
For better or worse, however, these distinctions are longstanding,
and the Court appears to be so confident of their meaning and stability
that it has to date failed to mount a serious effort to justify them.
Commentators may, and likely will, continue to wax indignant over
them.5, But more important than its tendency to draw constitutional
lines by ipse dixit is the Court's consistent effort to provide workable
rules that offer meaningful, but limited, constitutional protection of
property rights. In limiting the reach of Nollan and Dolan, the Court
considers the relative probability of a taking and attempts to offer both a
measure of formal protection and a hard limit on that protection's
reach, 59' just as the Court has done with its other categories of regulatory
effects that receive heightened scrutiny-permanent physical invasions
and total diminutions of valuei 6' The Court's exercises in line-drawing in

256. See Eduardo Mois~s Pefialver, Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference for
Landownership in Regulatory Takings Law, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 227 (2004); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102
YALE L.J. 1077, 1151-52 (1993); Sax, supra note 69, at 1441 n.48.
257. The legislative/adjudicative distinction in administrative law dates back at least to the early
twentieth century. See Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441
(1915) (finding a tax levied on all taxable property in the city of Denver to be sufficiently general to be
considered a form of legislative rule-making); Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (19o8) (finding a tax
levied on a small number of property owners was insufficiently legislative and the property owners
were due individualized hearings to challenge the tax as it was levied on their property). The Supreme
Court's obsession with the special qualities of land ownership, which it casts in deeply historical terms,
has been essential to its invigoration of the regulatory takings doctrine. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027-28 (1992) (proclaiming a special protection for land in "our constitutional
culture").
258. The most recent of such effort is Haskins, supra note 164, which largely ignores Lingle's
discussion of the exactions decisions. See id. at 519-21. Haskins applies an Epsteinian/natural rights
approach to the Court's dualities in order to conclude, with indignant vehemence, that "courts should
not artificially provide a method for governments to avoid the constitutionally mandated results of
their land policies." Id. at 522. Not only does he fail to explain how the bare text of the Fifth
Amendment mandates "proportionality" and "nexus," but he presumes throughout that the Court has
adopted or should adopt the understanding of expansive, unified constitutional property rights for
which Richard Epstein advocated two decades ago. See id. at 5o5-o9 (relying on RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985)). Unfortunately for Haskins's
argument, not only has the Court refused to share his (and Epstein's) conception of property, but the
Court in Lingle, and throughout all three of its takings decisions in the October 2oo4 Term, held that
the legal process by which property rights are considered by local governments makes a
constitutionally significant difference. See Fenster, supra note 25.
259. On the limited formal properties of the Court's takings categories, see Frank Michelman,
Takings, 1987,88 COLUM. L. REV. I6oo, 1622, 1628 (1988); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad Hocery:
A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1697, 1700 (1988).
26o. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (finding that a regulation that
denies an owner "all economically beneficial uses" of her land effects a per se taking); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982) (holding that a permanent physical
invasion of property effects a taking). In his dissent in Lucas, Justice Stevens criticized the majority's
line between so-called total takings, which receive a form of strict scrutiny, and takings that merely
diminish the property by 95%. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at lO64 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia's response was not particularly impressive: "Takings law is full of these 'all-or-

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:729

its takings jurisprudence may not be entirely persuasive as a matter of
formal logic, but over time their distinctions have calcified into accepted
constitutional common law doctrine. And, significantly, lower courts are
capable of making fine distinctions when factual circumstances blur the
lines the Court has drawn."' In order both to protect property owners
and to restrain judicial intervention under the Takings Clause, the Court
in Lingle has added another such distinction to its imperfect arsenal.
CONCLUSION

The implication of Lingle for exactions jurisprudence, then, is that
Nollan and Dolan apply only to a narrow subset of conditions. More
broadly, Lingle authoritatively declares the narrow, if still occasionally
powerful, reach of the regulatory takings doctrine. Lower courts seem
untroubled by the task of applying the decisions, albeit in a limited
manner, as the few reported appellate decisions on exactions since Lingle
demonstrate a small but discernible trend toward adopting the Court's
dicta as suggestive, if not binding. The Washington Supreme Court, for
example, in evaluating whether the state's impact fee statute
incorporates the No//an and Dolan tests, concluded that Nollan and
Dolan do not apply either to impact fees or to legislatively imposed
exactions. 6 The Federal Circuit has held that for Nollan and Dolan to
apply to a development condition requiring the property owners to
commit identified acres of their property to wetlands in order to mitigate
the destruction of other wetlands, the government must take the owners'
right to exclude. 63 Consistent with this limited reading of the exactions
decisions' reach, a Wisconsin intermediate appellate court has held that
Dolan's requirement of an "individualized determination" precludes a
facial challenge to a legislatively-imposed exactions program, because no

nothing' situations." Id. at lO9 n.8. Nor is the permanent physical invasion immune from criticism. See
Joseph William Singer & Jack M. Beermann, The Social Origins of Property, 6 CAN. J.L. &
JURISPRUDENCE 217, 224-28 (1993).

261. See, e.g., Norman v. United States, 429 F.3 d so8s, lo89-9 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (distinguishing
between exactions in which government requires a property owner to dedicate the right to exclude the
public, to which Nollan and Dolan apply, from exactions banning the property owner from developing
wetland property without forfeiting right to exclude, to which Nollan and Dolan do not apply); Smith
v. Town of Mendon, 822 N.E.2d 1214, 1219 (N.Y. 2004) (distinguishing between non-possessory
exactions, to which Nollan and Dolan do not apply, and fees in lieu of dedications, to which they do);
Dudek v. Umatilla County, 69 P.3d 751, 755-56 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (distinguishing a legislatively
adopted exaction scheme where the ordinance grants discretion to the county to determine the extent
of the exaction, to which Nollan and Dolan apply, from a legislatively determined impact fee charge,
to which they do not).
262. City of Olympia v. Drebick, 126 P.3d 802, 808 (Wash.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 436 (2oo6).
Accordingly, municipalities in Washington need only require that the impact fees they impose are
"reasonably related and beneficial to the particular development seeking approval," and may include
fees that would fund area-wide infrastructure. Id. at 8 i.
263. Norman, 429 F.3d at Io89-9o.
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6
property owner would as yet have been denied such a determination.2 ,
Although neither entirely coherent nor pleasing to advocates on
either side of the regulatory divide, Lingle recognizes the limited nature
of the Takings Clause and the finite ability of courts applying the
regulatory takings doctrine to complex, localized land use disputes.
Nollan and Dolan have had an uneven and uncertain effect on land use
regulation. Lingle attempted to clarify why and how those decisions fit
within the regulatory takings doctrine. It will limit their direct effects and
thus should help other institutions to more effectively perform their roles
in helping to direct and improve the necessary exercise of local
discretion.

264. See Wis. Builders Ass'n v. Wis. Dept. of Transp., 702 N.W.2d 433, 448 (Ct. App. Wisc. 2005).
In Wisconsin Builders, the challenged administrative scheme allowed a property owner to receive a
"special exception" if the condition on development, which prohibited structures and improvements
within a setback area adjacent to an existing road, would result in "practical difficulty or unnecessary
hardship... and [is] not contrary to the public interest," and which protected the DOT from providing
compensation if any improvements in that area are later damaged if the land were taken for road
widening. Id. at 436.
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